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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Court of Appeals of the State of Utah has jurisdic-
tion over this appeal pursuant to §78-2a-3(2)(a) Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, as amended (Addm. p. 1-2). 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case, as far as this appeal is concerned, is a civil 
matter arising from Robert D. Johnson1s Motion to Quash 
Harris-Dudley Plumbing Company's Writ of Execution and for 
declaratory relief in the wake of Harris-Dudley Plumbing 
Company's attachment and attempted sale of the boat and boat-
trailer as the property of Irene B. Hook. 
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STATEMENT OF ISSUE ON APPEAL 
The issue on appeal is whether or not the Trial Court's 
judgment denying Robert D. Johnson's (Appellant's) Motion to 
Quash the Appellee's Writ of Execution should be reversed. 
The ultimate issue before the Trial Court below was whether 
the Writ of Execution, caused to be issued by Harris-Dudley 
Plumbing Company, should be quashed pursuant to Robert D. 
Johnson's Motion, the immediate issue being the ownership of 
the subject boat and boat-trailer. The Trial Court determined 
that the boat and boat-trailer both belong to Irene Hook and 
accordingly denied Robert D. Johnson's Motion and ruled that 
Harris-Dudley Plumbing Company was free to proceed with an 
execution sale. Robert D. Johnson, has appealed contending 
that the boat and boat-trailer were his and that the Trial 
Court committed error in determining that said boat and boat-
trailer belonged to Irene Hook and in denying his Motion to 
Quash. 
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DEFINITIONS, REFERENCES AND ABBREVIATIONS 
Harris-Dudley Plumbing Company, a Utah corporation, Third 
Party Plaintiff and Judgment Creditor and Appellee, will be 
referred to as "Harris-Dudley." 
Robert D. Johnson, Third Party Defendant and Judgment 
Debtor and Appellant, will be referred to as "Johnson." 
Irene Hook, Third Part Defendant and Judgment Debtor and 
Appellant, will be referred to as "Hook." 
Transcript and page references therein will be referred 
to as (TR p. ) . 
Transcript of the evidentiary hearing on June 14, 1988 
and page references therein will be referred to as (EH 6/14/88 
P- ) • 
Transcript of the evidentiary hearing on August 5, 1988 
and page references therein will be referred to as (EH 8/5/88 
P- ) • 
Transcript of the evidentiary hearing of September 19, 
1989 and page references therein will be referred to as (EH 
9/19/89 p. ) . 
Transcript of the deposition of Robert D. Johnson on 
April 8, 1988 and page references therein will be referred to 
as (Johnson Depo 4/8/88 p. ) . 
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Transcript of the deposition of Robert D. Johnson on 
April 15, 1988 and page references therein will be referred to 
as (Johnson Depo 4/15/88 p. ). 
Transcript of the deposition of Robert D. Johnson on July 
27, 1988 and page references therein will be referred to as 
(Johnson Depo 7/27/88 p. ) . 
Transcript of the deposition of Irene Hook on July 2 6, 
1988 will be referred to as (Hook Depo 7/26/88 p. ) . 
Transcript of the deposition of Irene Hook on August 31, 
1988 will be referred to as (Hook Depo 8/31/88 p. ) . 
Addendum pages will be referred to as (Addm. p. ) . 
BOAT AND BOAT-TRAILER DESCRIPTIONS 
So there will be no confusion, the following documentary 
description, or similar description, in whole or in part, 
identifies the subject boat: 
HIN FBF 05221M79H, Status L, Type BB, Make FBF, 
Style 10, Year 79, Length 24 02, Tran-D 071186, 
Identification No- FBF 05221M79H24DS 
See Exhibits 3, 12, 41, 43 and 45, and 
Addm. p. 44, 52, 63, 65, and 67. 
The following documentary description, or similar 
description, in whole or in part, identifies the subject boat-
trailer: 
VIN 79184, Type LL, Make WLLC, Body Type BT, 
Model 791, Year 79, Tran-D 070986, Tran-D 071989, 
Cyl 0 
See Exhibits 1, 8, 13, 42, 44 and 46, and 
Addm. p. 43, 47, 64, 66, and 68. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellee Harris-Dudley feels that a more concise and 
accurate statement of the nature of the case is appropriate. 
After a plea of guilty to the charge of "Felony Theft" 
(TR p. 15-16), the Defendant Hook, at an appropriate 
restitution hearing, was found to have unlawfully taken from 
Harris-Dudley, her former employer, the sum of Three Hundred 
and Ninety-Nine Thousand Dollars ($399,000.00) (TR p. 40-41), 
whereupon a restitution order was accordingly entered (TR p. 
37-38) whereby Harris-Dudley was granted judgment against Hook 
in the amount of $399,000.00 and she was ordered to pay 
Harris-Dudley by way of restitution that amount. The 
"Restitution Order," (Addm. p. 29-31) by virtue of the provi-
sions of §77-18-1(6) U.C.A. 1953, as amended (Addm. p. 3-6), 
is considered a civil judgment under which a victim may seek 
civil remedy. Harris-Dudley subsequently caused a Writ of 
Execution to issue (TR p. 59-60), and attached as the property 
of Hook a certain boat and boat-trailer (TR p. 59-60) 
whereupon Johnson, claiming the boat was his, moved to quash 
the Writ of Execution and at the same time sought certain 
declaratory relief (TR p. 67-68). 
The protracted hearing below centered on the ownership of 
the boat and boat-trailer. The Trial Court found that Hook 
had received title to the subject boat and boat-trailer from 
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Johnson on or about May 28, 1982, that she subsequently 
registered the boat and boat-trailer with the Department of 
Motor Vehicles of the State of Utah and, that at the time of 
the last hearing session on September 19, 1989, was still the 
owner of both the subject boat and boat-trailer. The Trial 
Court further found that she had never reconveyed the boat to 
Johnson nor did she ever otherwise divest herself of the same 
although there was a purported reconveyance of the boat-
trailer on or about April 27, 1987 (Addm. p. 43). The Court 
also found, although such finding (in the light of the other 
findings) was not necessary for Harris-Dudley to prevail, that 
the purported reconveyance of the boat-trailer was without 
receiving a reasonable equivalent value in exchange for the 
purported transfer, and was with an actual intent to hinder, 
delay and defraud Harris-Dudley (see TR p. 310-311 and Addm. 
p. 37-38). 
The Court accordingly entered judgment in favor of 
Harris-Dudley (TR p. 306-307 and Addm. p. 40-42), adjudging 
that Hook was the owner of the subject boat and boat-trailer 
and also ruled that any purported transfer of the ownership of 
the boat and/or boat-trailer back to Johnson on or about April 
27, 1987, would be a fraudulent conveyance within the meaning 
of §75(sic)-l-7,8 [should be §25-1-7,8] U.C.A. 1953 (Addm. p. 
7-10), as amended, which section and related sections have 
since been repealed by Laws 1988 Chapter 59, §16 and replaced 
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by §45(sic)-6-1 [should be §25-6-1] to 13 Uniform Fraudulent 
Transfer Act (TR p. 306-313 and Addm. p. 12-24). 
The Court accordingly denied Johnson's Motion to Quash 
and adjudged that Harris-Dudley was free to proceed with the 
execution sale of the subject boat and boat-trailer (TR p. 
3 06-3 08) . It is from that judgment that the Appellant Johnson 
has appealed (TR p. 325-326 and Addm. p. 40-42). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Johnson has shown no basis whatsoever to disturb any of 
the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of the Trial Court 
and accordingly the judgment of the Trial Court denying 
Johnson's motion to quash should stand. 
The Trial Court never found that there had been any 
conveyance by Hook, fraudulent or otherwise, of the boat and 
boat-trailer back to Johnson. On the contrary, the Court 
specifically found that there was never any conveyance of the 
boat and only a purported conveyance of the boat-trailer back 
to Johnson and went on to find and determine that any convey-
ance would have been a fraudulent conveyance (TR p. 325-326 
and Addm. p. 40-41). 
The Trial Court having found that hook owned the boat and 
the boat-trailer, it was entirely proper that Johnson's Motion 
to Quash the Harris-Dudley Writ of Execution be denied. 
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Harris-Dudley should be awarded costs and attorney's fees 
pursuant to Rules 3 3 and 34 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure (Addm. p. 25, 26-27). 
ARGUMENT 
Point I 
JOHNSON HAS SHOWN NO BASIS WHATSOEVER TO 
DISTURB ANY OF THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW OF THE TRIAL COURT AND 
ACCORDINGLY THE JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL 
COURT DENYING JOHNSON'S MOTION TO QUASH 
SHOULD STAND. 
Appellantfs brief on appeal hardly qualifies as an 
appellate brief. It is virtually a rehash of the Appellant's 
argument to the Trial Court rather than pointing out any 
specific error on the part of the Trial Court. 
It should also be noted that this is not the time nor the 
place, by implication or direct argument, to cast any doubt as 
to the validity of the civil judgment of Harris-Dudley against 
Hook arising out of the criminal proceeding. This appeal 
involves only the civil aspect of the proceedings below 
centering on the ownership of the boat and boat-trailer. 
The following is delineated to dispel any suggestion or 
implication in Johnson's brief that there might have been some 
irregularity with respect to the criminal matter involving 
Hook and the resulting civil judgment against her: 
- 8 -
At the very outset of the evidentiary hearing, it was 
recognized that the parties to this civil proceeding were 
Harris-Dudley, Johnson and Hook - all three of them (EH 8/5/88 
p. 3-4). 
The evidentiary hearing in the Court below was lengthy 
and protracted, involving hearings on June 14, 1988, August 5, 
1988, and September 19, 1989. 
The deposition of Johnson required two sessions (see the 
transcripts of 4/8/88 and 4/15/88). The deposition of Hook 
required two sessions (see the transcripts of 7/26-27/88 and 
8/31/88). She failed to appear August 3, 1988, (Hook Depo 
8/3/88). Counsel for Johnson made no appearance whatsoever at 
any of the deposition sessions of Johnson or Hook (note the 
transcripts). 
The transcripts of all of the depositions of Johnson and 
Hook were, by stipulation, received in evidence (EH 8/5/88 p. 
8). 
The Court below found at an appropriate restitution 
hearing that Hook, over a considerable period of time, had 
unlawfully taken from Harris-Dudley the sum of $399,000.00 (TR 
p. 40-41 and Addm. p. 36-37) and, accordingly, the Court made 
and entered a Restitution Order (TR p. 37-39 and Addm. p. 29-
31) whereby Harris-Dudley was granted judgment against Hook in 
the amount of $399,000.00 and she was ordered to pay to 
Harris-Dudley by way of restitution that amount (TR p. 37-39 
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and Addm. p. 29-31). The Restitution Order by its express 
terms and by virtue of the provisions of §77-18-1(6) U.C.A. 
1953, as amended (Addm. p. 5), is a legal judgment enforceable 
under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Although Hook moved 
for a rehearing and objected to the proposed Restitution Order 
(TR p. 31-32), the Restitution Order (Addm. p. 29-31) was 
nevertheless entered. Hook subsequently filed an Affidavit 
(TR p. 73-74 and Addm. p. 54-62) seeking to have the Court set 
aside the Restitution Order which had been entered. Hookfs 
effort in that regard was resisted by the State (TR p. 80-81) . 
Her motion to vacate the Restitution Order was denied (TR p. 
96) . She never appealed the Restitution Ord€»r. 
Harris-Dudley eventually sought and obtained an Order in 
Supplemental Proceedings (TR p. 77-78) which was resisted by 
Hook (TR p. 109-110). The Court thereupon entered an order 
authorizing Harris-Dudley to continue to seek civil remedy 
against Hook (TR p. 104-107). As previously indicated, this 
appeal involves only the civil aspect of the proceedings below 
centering on the ownership of the boat and boat-trailer. 
Accordingly, in the light of all that has transpired in 
the case, statements by the Appellant in his brief, such as 
the following, are ridiculous and in some instances, contrary 
to the record and outright misleading: 
Page 7 
Johnson contends that the only 
testimony Harris has placed on the issue 
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of the Motion to Quash is an affidavit 
filed by Mr. John R. Dudley, President of 
the Company Harris-Dudley Plumbing 
Company (TR p. 116-118). His entire 
affidavit is not shown to be based on any 
legal, documentary or other evidence and 
further states conclusions of law that 
clearly are not admissible. The 
affidavit is self serving and does 
nothing to counter Johnson's legitimate 
claim to the property. 
Page 9 
Johnson has established all the 
viable evidence showing his ownership and 
the legal and pragmatic rationale for all 
transactions. There is no reliable sub-
stantial evidence to the contrary by the 
opposing party, just innuendoes and 
hearsay, and some fear. 
... Johnson's unrebutted evidence alone 
stands for a finding of no reasonable 
basis whatsoever for the trial Court's 
ruling in this matter. 
Harris's evidence on the other hand 
was irrelevant, hearsay, remote and did 
not focus on the issue and although in 
the record most was stricken as remote 
and hearsay. ... 
The following statement by Johnson, through his counsel 
on page 6 of his brief, is absolutely untrue and is contrary 
to documentary evidence (Exhibit 1 and Addm. p. 43) and the 
express finding of the Court (TR p. 310 and Addm. p. 37): 
The next transaction occurred April 27, 
1987, when Ms. Hook transferred the boat 
back to Johnson for release of a debt 
owed to Johnson by Ms. Hook. (TR 64, 65 
Exhibit A). 
It is clear on its face that the purported conveyance of 
April 27, 1987, by virtue of the signed-off title (Exhibit 1 
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and Addm. p. 43), did not even relate to the boat but 
purported to relate only to the boat-trailer. Exhibit 1 on 
its face relates to the boat-trailer only and not to the boat. 
And the Trial Court so found (see Findings of Fact Nos. 3 and 
6, TR p. 309-312, and Addm. p. 36-39). Counsel for the 
Appellant made the same futile, deceptive argument to the 
Trial Court. The evidence was clear that Hook was in fact the 
registered owner of both the boat and the boat-trailer right 
up to the time of the last hearing on September 19, 1989, (see 
Exhibits 5, 8, 12, 13, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46 and Addm. p. 45-
46, 47, 52, 53, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68). 
As a matter of fact, counsel for Johnson is totally 
inconsistent in his argument when he states on page 6 of the 
Appellant's Brief: 
The next transaction occurred April 27, 
1987, when Ms. Hook transferred the boat 
back to Johnson ... (emphasis added) 
and then on page 8 states: 
... Johnson's documents showed a signed 
off title to the trailer ... (emphasis 
added) 
Any purported transfer to Johnson of the boat-trailer was 
evidenced only by the "signed off title" that referred solely 
to the boat-trailer and not to the boat (Exhibit 1 and Addm. 
p. 43) . The Trial Court was not misled and noted that the 
purported "transfer back," evidenced by the signed off title, 
involved only the boat-trailer and recognized that in spite of 
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the "signed off title" purportedly given to Johnson, that 
Hook, nevertheless, remained the registered title owner of 
both the boat and the boat-trailer right up to the time of the 
last hearing (see Exhibits as indicated above). 
Johnson argues to this court, as he did at trial, that 
there was a transfer of the boat in Wyoming (Appellant's Brief 
p. 7; EH 9/19/89 p. 77-80). But any claim of a transfer in 
Wyoming is contrary to his earlier testimony, and even Hook's 
testimony. Johnson claimed early in the Trial Court 
proceeding, both during the trial and in deposition, that the 
boat was transferred to him on April 27, 1987, (and not in 
Wyoming) by virtue of the "signed off title" (Exhibits 1 and 
9 and Addm. p. 43, 49-51; EH 6/14/88 p. 47-59; Johnson Depo 
4/8/88 p. 49-50, 53-54). Hook also testified in her 
deposition that there was a transfer of the boat on April 27, 
1987, by virtue of the signed off title (Hook Depo 7/26/88 p. 
50-51). But as already pointed out (and was pointed out to 
the Trial Court and as the Trial Court obviously believed) the 
purported transaction of April 27, 1987, involved only the 
boat-trailer (Exhibit 1 and Addm. p. 43) and not the boat. 
And when Johnson was confronted with that reality by way of 
Harris-Dudley's "Memorandum in Opposition to Robert D. 
Johnson's Motion to Quash" and also at trial — that the 
signed off title (Exhibit 1 and Addm. p. 43) referred to the 
boat-trailer and not to the boat (TR p. 119-140; EH 6/14/88 
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p. 41-48) then counsel for Johnson prepared an Affidavit 
for Hook to sign (Exhibit 15 and Addm. p. 54-62; Hook Depo p. 
30-38) whereby Hook then claimed that there had been a 
transfer of title to the boat in Wyoming on or about May 6, 
1987, (Exhibit 15 and Addm. p. 54-62) although Hook testified 
in her deposition when questioned about the Affidavit that she 
didn't even know what an affidavit was (Hook Depo 7/26/88 p. 
42) and Johnson likewise shifted to his claim that there had 
been some transfer of the boat to him in Wyoming (EH 9/19/89 
p. 77-80) and his counsel has so argued (Appellant's Brief p. 
7) . The Trial Court was obviously ill impressed with the 
Wyoming episode, particularly, no doubt, in light of the fact 
that when Hook went with Johnson to Wyoming, she, by her own 
admission, was in a "daze" and didn't even know what she was 
doing (Hook Depo 7/26/88 p. 73-75). Her whole testimony with 
respect to her going to Wyoming and what happened there is 
ludicrous (Hook Depo 7/26/88 p. 70-75). 
Her involvement with Johnson in his registering the boat 
in his name in Wyoming was certainly not convincing evidence 
of any transfer. It is much more consistent with a conniving 
effort on the part of Hook and Johnson to simply let the boat 
be registered in Wyoming in Johnson's name to conceal Hook's 
ownership and keep Harris-Dudley from executing on it. And 
even if it were evidence of any transfer, it certainly 
wouldn't offset all of the contrary evidence which the Trial 
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Court had before it showing that Hook was in fact the owner of 
the boat right up to the time of the trial. Her lack of 
integrity and candor were obvious. Johnson's argument 
centering on the Wyoming episode didn't impress the Trial 
Court at all in the face of all the other evidence showing 
Hook's ownership of both the boat and the boat-trailer. All 
an applicant had to do in the State of Wyoming to register a 
boat was to fill out an application and represent that the 
boat was his. That was the essence of Johnson's testimony (EH 
6/14/88 p. 49; EH 8/5/88 p. 57-59). The finding of Hook's 
ownership of both the boat and boat-trailer is amply supported 
by the evidence. The Trial Court was totally justified in 
disregarding Johnson's argument, but which he insists on 
repeating to this Court. Finding No. 3 is amply supported by 
the evidence. 
Furthermore, not only was the evidence, both oral (by 
witnesses at the protracted hearing and also at the deposi-
tions) and documentary, very extensive, but, in addition, 
memorandums were filed analyzing the evidence. Reference is 
specifically made to Harris-Dudley's "Memorandum in Opposition 
to Robert D. Johnson1 s Motion to Quash" of May 19, 1988, (TR 
p. 119-140) and to Harris Dudley's "Post-Trial Memorandum" of 
October 2, 1989, (TR 264-279). The Court's attention is 
invited to both of those memorandums, which are a part of the 
record as indicated, for a more elaborate discussion and 
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analysis of the evidence which fully support the Trial Court's 
findings. There would seem to be no need of repeating in this 
brief what is set forth very clearly in those memorandums. 
The Court's attention is invited to the Findings of Fact 
Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 6 (Addm. p. 37-38) made and entered by the 
Trial Court (TR 309-312): 
It is undisputed that Hook acquired both the boat and 
boat-trailer on or about May 28, 1982, as noted by the Court 
in Finding No. 1 (TR p. 310 and Addm. 37). Finding No. 1 is 
amply supported by the Bill of Sale (Exhibit 3 and Addm. p. 
44) and the testimony of both Johnson (EH 6/14/88 p. 12; 
Johnson Depo 4/15/88 p. 4-5) and the testimony of Hook (Hook 
Depo 7/26/88 p. 47-49). 
Finding No. 2 is amply supported by the Certificate of 
Registration (see Exhibits 5, 12, 13, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46 
and Addm. p. 45-46, 52, 53, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68) and the 
testimony of Hook (Hook Depo 7/26/88 p. 45) , as well as the 
testimony of Johnson (Johnson Depo 4/15/88 p. 12) . 
There is no documentary evidence whatsoever contrary to 
Finding No. 3, and both Finding Nos. 3 and 6 are fully 
supported by the evidence. As indicated above, on April 27, 
1987, Irene B. Hook purported to sign off on a Certificate of 
Title (Exhibit 1 and Addm. p. 43) and it is by virtue of that 
document that Johnson at trial claimed to have received the 
boat (Johnson Depo 4/8/88 p. 47-48). The fact of the matter 
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is, as aireaay indicated, the Certificate of Title doesn't 
even refer to the boat (Exhibit 1 and Addm. p. 43) , but 
relates only to the boat-trailer. Moreover, as noted above, 
Hook continued to remain the registered owner of not only the 
boat but also the boat-trailer right up to the time of the 
last hearing on September 19, 1989, (Exhibits 5, 12, 13, 41, 
42, 43, 44, 45, 46 and Addm. p. 45-46, 52, 53, 63, 64, 65, 66, 
67, 68) . Furthermore, she continued to exercise ownership and 
dominion over both the boat and boat-trailer and to use them 
(Hook Depo 7/26/88 p. 51-53; Johnson Depo 4/15/88 p. 9-10). 
She carried insurance on the boat and boat-trailer to May 3, 
1988, (Hook Depo 7/26/88 p. 103-104; EH 9/19/89 p. 18-19). 
Hook took care of the licensing and registration (Hook Depo 
7/26/88 p. 65-70) . She kept the boat at Flaming Gorge in her 
garage at Manila (EH 8/5/88 p. 9-10; Johnson Depo 4/8/88 p. 
44-45; EH 6/14/88 p. 63; Hook Depo 7/26/88 p. 105). Going 
back to April 27, 1982, Johnson couldn't even remember having 
driven the boat (EH 8/5/88 p. 34). Hook really arranged for 
the transfer of the boat back to Salt Lake City in a round 
about way (Hook Depo 7/26/88 p. 107) . And then Hook tried to 
sell the boat. There is no dispute about that. Johnson at 
the Evidentiary Hearing on June 14, 1988, testified that Hook 
was trying to sell the boat, but was selling it for him as his 
agent (EH 6/14/88 p. 56-57). But later, on deposition and at 
a succeeding session in Court, Johnson contradicted himself 
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and testified that he wasn't trying to sell the boat (Johnson 
Depo 7/27/88 p. 44-45; EH 8/5/88 p. 56) and that he had not 
delegated anyone to sell it for him (Johnson Depo 7/27/88 p. 
45; EH 8/5/88 p. 56). But Hook testified that she was trying 
to sell the boat, but that it was for Johnson (Hook Depo 
7/26/88 p. 107-108). The conflicting testimony is glaring. 
Certainly, there is no doubt about the fact that Hook was 
trying to sell the boat. James Craft, an acquaintance of Hook 
(EH 9/19/89 p. 27-28) , testified that Hook was trying to sell 
the 24 f fiberfoam boat to him for $10,000.00 and even took him 
out to see it (EH 9/19/89 p. 40-45) . All of the foregoing was 
obviously much more persuasive to the Trial Court than a 
purported signed-off title to the boat-trailer that obviously 
neither Hook nor Johnson paid attention to. 
With the depositions of Hook and Johnson having been made 
part of the record, and with the lengthy hearing involving 
three separate sessions, there is a mass of evidence, much of 
which is conflicting, showing deceitful conduct on the part of 
both Hook and Johnson to keep Harris-Dudley from executing on 
the boat. As pointed out in our Post-Trial Memorandum (TR 
264-279), dealing with Johnson and Hook with respect to the 
boat is like the proverbial shell game: "Guess where the pea 
[boat] is?" (TR 273) . From what is cited above, it is clear 
that there is ample evidence supporting the findings with 
respect to Hook's ownership of both the boat and the boat-
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trailer. The Court was entirely proper in denying Johnson's 
Motion to Quash the execution caused to be issued by Harris-
Dudley. 
The Appellate Court is, of course, required to view the 
evidence, and any inferences drawn therefrom, and all of the 
circumstances shown thereby, as well as the findings and 
judgment of the Trial Court, with a presumption of validity 
and correctness. In so doing the Court will not disturb the 
findings and judgment if they find substantial support in the 
evidence viewed in a light most favorable to Harris-Dudley. 
See Rodgers v. Hansen, 580 P.2d 233 (Utah 1978) ; O&erhansly v. 
Earle, 572 P.2d 1384 (Utah 1977); Carnesecca v. Carnesecca, 
572 P.2d 708 (Utah 1977); Hanover Ltd. v. Fields, 568 P.2d 751 
(Utah 1977); Robertson v. Hutchison, 560 P.2d 1110 (Utah 
1977); Cornia v. Cornia, 546 P.2d 890 (Utah 1976); Cutler v. 
Bowen, 543 P.2d 1349 (Utah 1975); Kesler v. Rogers, 542 P.2d 
354 (Utah 1975). Where evidence is in conflict, the Appellate 
Court assumes that the Trial Court believed those aspects of 
evidence that support its findings. See Fillmore City v. 
Reeve, 571 P.2d 1316 (Utah 1977). 
With Hook continuing as the registered owner of both the 
boat and the boat-trailer, Harris-Dudley was entirely 
justified in executing on the same. 
Further, counsel's statement on page 15 of his brief is 
another example of a misleading and deceptive statement: 
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He disallowed the testimony of Mr. James 
Craft and Marcia Eldridge as hearsay. 
As a matter of fact, the testimony was not disallowed. 
Counsel for Johnson cited nothing in the record for such a 
statement, nor could he. Counsel's motion to strike the 
testimony was taken under advisement (EH 9/19/89 p. 72), with 
no ruling having ever been made. Counsel for Johnson never 
thereafter pressed the Court for any ruling. 
Counsel for Harris-Dudley had urged that the testimony of 
James Craft was not heresay, that we were essentially dealing 
with a "verbal act," which was relied upon by James Craft. He 
not only testified that Hook tried to sell him her boat, but 
she took him out to see it. We were not only dealing with 
what Hook said to James Craft, but, in addition, his testimony 
as to what he and Hook did pursuant to the effort to sell -
go out together and look at the boat. It was clear that while 
the statement of Hook might not, by itself, prove that she 
owned the boat, the testimony of James Craft did prove that 
she said what she said and they did what they did. The Trial 
Court was entirely justified in considering this as further 
evidence of Hook's ownership of the boat, although there was 
ample evidence of that ownership even without the testimony of 
James Craft. In any event, the testimony was not stricken. 
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Point II 
THE TRIAL COURT NEVER FOUND THAT THERE 
HAD BEEN ANY CONVEYANCE BY HOOK, FRAUD-
ULENT OR OTHERWISE, OF THE BOAT AND BOAT-
TRAILER BACK TO JOHNSON. ON THE 
CONTRARY, THE COURT SPECIFICALLY FOUND 
THAT THERE WAS NEVER ANY CONVEYANCE OF 
THE BOAT AND ONLY A PURPORTED CONVEYANCE 
OF THE BOAT-TRAILER BACK TO JOHNSON AND 
WENT ON TO FIND AND DETERMINE THAT ANY 
CONVEYANCE WOULD HAVE BEEN A FRAUDULENT 
CONVEYANCE. 
The Trial Court never found that there had been any 
conveyance by Hook, fraudulent or otherwise, of the boat and 
boat-trailer back to Johnson. The central issue at the trial 
of the case was Hook's ownership of the boat and boat-trailer 
as opposed to Johnson's claim of ownership. The primary 
question was not whether there had been a fraudulent 
conveyance, but whether there had been any conveyance at all. 
Contrary to Johnson's argument, the Court specifically found 
that there never was any conveyance of the boat and only a 
purported conveyance of the boat-trailer back to Johnson and 
then went on to find and determine that any conveyance would 
have been a fraudulent conveyance. The Court's attention is 
invited to Findings of Fact 1, 2, 3 and 6 and to the Conclu-
sions of Law Nos. 1 and 2 (TR p. 309-311 and Addm. p. 36-39) . 
Johnson's Argument No. 2 assumes the conveyance of the 
boat and boat-trailer to him and argues that such was not a 
"fraudulent conveyance." But, as already pointed out, the 
Court specifically found that there was never any conveyance 
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whatsoever of the boat by Hook back to Johnson. And, as 
noted, there was ample evidence to support such a finding. 
The issue of whether or not there was a "fraudulent 
conveyance" could only apply to the boat-trailer since the 
purported conveyance of April 24, 1987, involv€>d a "signed off 
title" (Addm. p. 43) identifying only the boat-trailer and not 
the boat. And with respect to any conveyance of the boat-
trailer, the Court found that there was only a purported 
conveyance of the boat-trailer on April 27, 1987, as evidenced 
by the signed off title (Addm. p. 43) . But, as already 
pointed out under Point I above, there was uncontroverted 
evidence of Hook's continued ownership, including her 
continuing to be the registered owner way beyond April 27, 
1987, right up until the time of the last hearing (see 
Exhibits 5, 12, 13, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46 and Addm. p. 45-46, 
52, 53, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68). Accordingly, the Trial Court 
was entirely justified in disregarding the purported convey-
ance of the boat-trailer in light of the weighty evidence of 
Hook's continued ownership. 
However, in light of the realities of the case and the 
evidence before it, the Court went on to find that any convey-
ance of the boat or boat-trailer would have been a fraudulent 
conveyance. Such was not necessary in view of the fact that 
the Court specifically found that there was no reconveyance of 
either the boat or the boat-trailer. There was, in reality, 
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no need for the Court to consider whether there was a 
fraudulent conveyance of the boat and boat-trailer back to 
Johnson. Nevertheless, the Court, being quite aware of all 
the evidence which was before it, did rule, in effect, that 
even if there had been a conveyance or purported conveyance of 
either the boat or boat-trailer (but there was only a 
purported conveyance of the boat-trailer), such would have 
been fraudulent within the meaning of the fraudulent 
conveyance statute. 
With respect to the matter of a "fraudulent conveyance" 
of the boat-trailer — if there had been a conveyance — the 
following is noted: 
December 23, 1986: *A civil action was initiated -
Summons and Complaint. 
January 12, 1987: *An Amended Complaint was filed and 
in the hands of her attorney assert-
ing the claim of in excess of 
$300,000.00 for various causes of 
action including fraud. 
*The Trial Court and Hook were, of course, well aware of 
the civil action that had been initiated by Harris-Dudley 
against Hook and the Amended Complaint that was filed 
against her asserting the claim of in excess of 
$3 00,000.00 for various causes of action, including 
fraud, as was referred to in Harris-Dudleyfs "Post-Trial 
Memorandum" (TR p. 278). 
January , 1987: Information was filed (TR p. 14) 
(Day of the month is not discernable) 
March 9, 1987: Hook pleaded guilty to the charge as 
set forth in the information (TR p. 
15-16). 
March 9, 1987: The arraignment and plea of guilty 
(TR p. 17) . 
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April 6, 1987: Hook was sentenced (TR p. 18). 
April 27, 1987: Date that Hook purported to sign off 
on the title to the boat-trailer 
(Exhibit 1 and Addm. p. 43). 
Furthermore, there was evidence of the pcist intimate and 
long standing relationship between Johnson and Hook (Hook Depo 
8/31/88 p. 38; EH 6/14/88 p. 21-33; EH 8/5/88 p. 89-116; EH 
9/19/89 p. 7). The Court, no doubt, believed that Hook never 
really owed Johnson anything whatsoever (EH 6/14/88 p. 68, 70; 
Hook Depo 7/26/88 p. 38-40). There was never any note or 
writing of any kind (EH 6/14/88 p. 68; Hook Depo 7/26/88 p. 
39) with respect to any money Johnson claimed he gave to Hook; 
it was simply to help her out (EH 6/14/88 p. 70; Johnson Depo 
4/8/88 p. 31). Accordingly, even if any money whatsoever had 
been given to Hook, the Court, no doubt, believed that it was 
by way of a gift rather than a loan. And anyway it was more 
than, eight years prior to Hook's deposition on July 26, 1988, 
that any money had passed between her and Johnson (Hook Depo 
7/26/88 p. 16). Marsha Eldridge testified that Hook stated in 
her presence that she, Hook, had given Johnson a substantial 
sum of money which she believed was $10,000.00, in connection 
with an IRS audit of Johnson (EH 9/19/89 p. 53). And on 
another occasion Hook had stated in her presence, "I don't owe 
him a damned dime, not anything." (EH 9-19-89 p. 46-52). And 
earlier when Hook was asked on her deposition whether on at 
least three occasions she didn't, in essence, state, "I don't 
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owe him a damned thing," she replied, "I don't know," and, "I 
couldn't say one way or the other," (Hook Depo 7/26/88 p. 39, 
41) . In view of all that evidence, the Court was entirely 
justified in finding that the "purported reconveyance of the 
boat-trailer" even if it had been intended to be a 
conveyance — was, in fact, a "fraudulent conveyance" without 
receiving a reasonable equivalent value in exchange for the 
purported transfer and was with an actual intent to hinder, 
delay and defraud Harris-Dudley. 
But as indicated above, the evidence was overwhelming 
that Hook was the continuous owner of both the boat and the 
boat-trailer right up to the time of the last hearing on 
September 19, 1989. 
Point III 
THE TRIAL COURT HAVING FOUND THAT HOOK 
OWNED THE BOAT AND THE BOAT-TRAILER, IT 
WAS ENTIRELY PROPER THAT JOHNSON1S MOTION 
TO QUASH THE HARRIS-DUDLEY WRIT OP 
EXECUTION BE DENIED. 
It is obvious that it was entirely proper for the Trial 
Court, having found that Hook owned the boat and the boat-
trailer, to deny Johnson's Motion to Quash the Harris-Dudley 
Writ of Execution and order that Harris-Dudley be free to 
proceed with the execution sale. Reference is made to 
Findings of Fact Nos. 1 and 2 (TR p. 310 and Addm. p. 37), 
Conclusion of Law No. 1 (TR p. 311 and Addm. p. 37) and the 
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Judgment and Order of the Trial Court (TR 306-307 and Addm. p. 
40-42). 
Point IV 
HARRIS-DUDLEY SHOULD BE AWARDED COSTS AND 
ATTORNEY'S FEES PURSUANT TO RULES 33 AND 
34 OP THE UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PRO-
CEDURE. 
Harris-Dudley should be awarded costs and attorney's fees 
pursuant to Rules 3 3 and 34 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, copies of said rules being set forth in the 
Addendum to this brief at pages 25, 26-27• Appellant's appeal 
is "frivolous" and has caused needless delay and expense. The 
appeal is not grounded in fact, nor warranted by existing law 
and is not based on a good faith argument. Specifically, the 
Court's attention is invited to the following: 
1. The Appellant's (Johnson's) brief is nothing more 
than a rehash of the argument made in the Trial Court. That 
argument was rejected and this is no place for it to be 
repeated. The brief fails to rise to the level of an 
Appellate argument. 
2. Johnson's brief is replete with misleading, incon-
sistent and deceptive statements, such as the following: 
P. 1, f 3 - There is nothing in the record whatsoever to 
show that both the boat and boat-trailer were "in his 
possession." As a matter of fact, they were not "in his 
possession." Hook arranged, in a round about way, to have her 
son bring the boat and boat-trailer to Salt Lake City for the 
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purpose of sale. The boat and boat-trailer were brought back 
from Hook's place at Flaming Gorge and was stored on her son's 
property for quite a while and then: 
We moved it off his driveway to the 
property of a friend of my second son. 
When the Constable went out to get it, it 
was on Ron Burnside's property, the 
friend. (Hook Depo 8/31/88 p. 58-59) 
P. 1, 1 3 - The boat and boat-trailer were executed on as 
the property of Hook, and Harris-Dudley did in fact have a 
civil judgment resulting from a restitution order. The words 
"alleged" and "believed" while not critical, are not correct 
and they are misleading. 
P. 1, f 4 - The central issue at the evidentiary hearing 
was the ownership of the boat and boat-trailer. The 
indication of a "subsequent issue of the legal ownership of 
the boat and trailer" is deceptive and suggests that ownership 
was an incidental matter. Ownership was not some "subsequent" 
issue. It was the issue. 
P. 2, f 1 - The following unclear statement with respect 
to the findings is deceptive: 
That Irene Hook is the owner of the boat 
and trailer, there was a fraudulent 
conveyance of the property to Johnson and 
Johnson's Motion to Quash is denied. 
Reference is made to the Findings themselves (TR p. 3 06-
312 and Addm. p. 3 6-39) . The statement suggests that Hook was 
found to be the owner because of a fraudulent conveyance with 
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the implication that her ownership would fail if there were 
not a fraudulent conveyance. The Court did not find that Hook 
remained the owner of both the boat and boat-trailer because 
there was a fraudulent conveyance. The Findings speak for 
themselves (Addm. p. 3 6-39). The Court found that Hook was 
in fact the owner of the boat and boat-trailer right up to the 
time of the hearing based on a mass of evidence. The Court 
also found that there never was any conveyance, fraudulent or 
otherwise, of either the boat or boat-trailer only a 
purported conveyance of the boat-trailer (Addm. p. 43). The 
Court went on to also find that any conveyance of the boat or 
boat-trailer would have been a fraudulent conveyance (Addm. p. 
3 6-39) . The latter finding was not essential to either the 
Conclusions of Law or the judgment. Counsel's statement that 
the Court believed that the ownership resulted from a convey-
ance that failed because it was a "fraudulent conveyance" is 
not in accordance with the Findings (Addm. p. 3 6-3 9) . 
Reference is made to Points I and II of this brief. 
P. 2, 1[ 4 - Paragraph 2 of the STATEMENT OF ISSUE ON 
APPEAL not only misconceives the findings, but again would 
tend to mislead the court: 
Whether or not there was sufficient 
evidence to warrant the Court's Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law that there 
was any fraudulent conveyance of the boat 
and trailer. 
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If Hook was the owner of the boat and boat-trailer and if 
she never conveyed or divested herself of either of them, then 
whether or not there was a fraudulent conveyance is 
essentially moot. The finding that if there had been a 
conveyance it would have been fraudulent is unnecessary. The 
Court was essentially noting that if there had been a 
conveyance, it would have been a fraudulent one. Furthermore, 
such could only apply to the purported conveyance of the boat-
trailer as has already been pointed out. 
The determination of ownership of the boat and boat-
trailer did not at all depend upon any Finding of Fact or 
Conclusions of Law with respect to a "fraudulent conveyance." 
As already indicated, the Court specifically found that Hook 
was the owner of the boat and boat-trailer and that there had 
never been any reconveyance of either. The purported 
conveyance of the boat-trailer is so inconsistent with Hook's 
continued ownership of the same as well as the boat that the 
Court obviously paid no attention to the purported conveyance. 
The Court simply went on to find that any conveyance of the 
boat or boat-trailer would have been a fraudulent conveyance. 
But such a finding was not essential to the decision. 
P. 3, 5 2 - The statement that: 
A non-evidentiary hearing was held before 
Judge Uno on the 21st day of September, 
1987. 
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is totally untrue. The statement is apparently made to 
suggest to the Court that the Restitution Order stems from 
something "non-evidentiary" — even casual. The fact is there 
was an evidentiary hearing of some magnitude resulting in the 
Court's finding of indebtedness and the Order of Restitution 
(Addm. p. 29-31). 
P. 4, f 2 - There was no "second determination of 
restitution." There was a restitution hearing (Addm. p. 28) 
resulting in the finding of Hook's indebtedness and the Order 
and Judgment that followed (Addm. p. 40-42). 
P. 4, 5 2 - The statement that: 
Harris, on March 17, 1988, started civil 
proceedings against Ms. Hook to collect 
the money by a motion in Supplementary 
Proceedings. 
may not be critical, but again is an outright misstatement. 
By statute, Harris-Dudley had a civil judgment and in an 
effort to recover on that judgment, did obtain an Order in 
Supplemental Proceedings. 
P. 4, 5 2 - There is no basis for any such statement as, 
"This was the only civil pleading in the whole case." This 
statement, again, seems to have been made to suggest something 
irregular. Harris-Dudley had a judgment and was proceeding in 
an orderly and proper manner to recover on the judgment. The 
Order in Supplemental Proceeding was entirely appropriate as 
was the Writ of Execution. 
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jf. 4, f 4 - The first issue considered at the evidentiary 
hearing was not "whether or not Johnson owned the boat and 
trailer," but whether Hook owned the boat and boat-trailer. 
The boat and boat-trailer were executed upon as the property 
of Hook and the Court found that indeed both boat and boat-
trailer were hers. Johnson intervened by filing a Motion to 
Quash the writ of execution. It was Harris-Dudley's position 
that Hook was the owner of both the boat and boat-trailer and 
that there had never been any conveyance of either one of them 
to Johnson. The Court so found. It was further argued that 
if there had been such a conveyance (which there was not) it 
would have been a fraudulent conveyance and the Court so 
found. 
E|. 5, f 1 - The following statement is totally false: 
That on or about April 27, 1987 she 
transferred the boat and trailer back to 
him. 
The Court found that there was never any conveyance of either 
the boat or boat-trailer of April 27, 1987, and that the 
signed-off title to the boat-trailer was only a "purported 
conveyance" in view of all the mass of evidence indicating 
Hook's continued ownership, dominion and control of both the 
boat and boat-trailer (see Point I). 
PL 5, f 2 - There was never any ruling that there was a 
fraudulent transfer of the boat to Johnson. The Court 
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specifically found that there was never any conveyance 
whatsoever of the boat. 
P. 6, 5 3 - The following statement is false: 
The next transaction occurred April 27, 
1987, when Ms. Hook transferred the boat 
back to Johnson ... 
The evidence is clear and the Court so found that there 
was never any conveyance of the boat on April 27, 1987, but 
only a purported conveyance of the boat-trailer (Addm. p. 43) . 
It is also noted that this statement is inconsistent with the 
above quoted statement in 1 1 on P. 5. 
P. 7, J 1 - The statement in the first paragraph on page 
7 referring to the Wyoming episode is not a correct statement 
of what happened in Wyoming and is a rehash of the argument 
made to the Trial Court which was totally rejected. As 
already pointed out, there is nothing in the evidence at all 
compelling any finding of any conveyance of the boat in 
Wyoming. 
P. 7, 5 2 - The statement: 
Johnson contends that the only testimony 
Harris has placed on the issue of the 
Motion to Quash is an affidavit filed by 
Mr. John R. Dudley ... 
is a gross misstatement of what transpired in the three-
session evidentiary hearing. The statement "that the only 
testimony" was "an affidavit" is ridiculous. Reference is 
made to the transcripts of the three-hearing sessions. 
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P. 7, 1 3 - Testimony elicited from Johnson with respect 
to his relationship with Hook is neither remote nor irrele-
vant. It had to do with the reality of a fraudulent convey-
ance if there had in fact been any conveyance. 
P« 7 9 K 4 - There is no basis whatsoever for any 
statement like: 
The evidence presented by Harris was not 
competent to establish ownership of the 
boat. 
This is nothing but a wild, irresponsible statement. The 
Court's attention is invited to the delineation of the 
evidence already set forth in this brief. 
P. 7-8, 5 4-1 - The statement with respect to 
"documentary evidence" and "registration" is not keyed to any 
of the transcripts and is an irresponsible statement. Refer-
ence is made to what has already been set forth in this brief. 
P. 8, 5 1 - The Statement that: 
Harris did not present any evidence on 
the Motion to Quash. 
would cause the Court to wonder where Johnson and his counsel 
were during the three session evidentiary hearing. Statements 
that: 
*. 8, J 3 
In Johnson's case evidence clearly and 
convincingly shows not only a valid claim 
on his part but legal ownership. 
and that: 
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P. 8, 5 3 
Irene Hook did not own the boat upon 
which the execution was issued. 
are just so much talk, are not referenced to anything in the 
record, and nothing more than a wild and superficial argument 
— and perhaps wishful thinking. 
Counsel's statement that: 
P. 8, J 3 
The sole and only purpose of the hearing 
before Judge Uno was to determine whether 
or not the Motion to Quash a Writ of 
Execution on property owned by Johnson 
should have been granted. 
begs the question of ownership and seems to suggest that 
perhaps the Trial Court should have ruled on Johnson's motion 
before the ownership of the boat and boat-trailer were 
determined. The statement Ls nonsense and frivolous. 
Statements that: 
P- 9, H 2 
Johnson has established all the viable 
evidence showing his ownership and the 
legal and pragmatic rationale for all 
transactions. 
9, 1 2 
There is no reliable substantial evidence 
to the contrary of the opposing party, 
just innuendos and hearsay, and some 
fear, 
and 
P. 9, 5 3 
Harris's evidence on the other hand was 
irrelevant, hearsay, remote and did not 
focus on the issue and although in the 
and 
P. 
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record most was stricken as remote and 
hearsay, 
are frivolous, irresponsible, untrue and deceptive. 
There is no basis nor indeed anything even cited as a 
basis for the statement that: 
P. 9, ! 2 
Johnson's rebutted evidence alone stands 
for a finding of no reasonable basis 
whatsoever for the Trial Court's ruling 
in this matter. 
P 10, J 4 - Without any analysis of the record and in the 
face of all the evidence that was presented, the following 
statement is again irresponsible: 
The findings in this case should be 
disturbed as they are not based on 
substantial, competent and admissible 
evidence. 
The following is another wild frivolous statement which is 
totally unjustified in the face of the record that is before 
the Court. 
J. 11, J 2 - In view of all the evidence that has been 
delineated and is in the record, the following statement has 
no basis whatsoever; indeed no basis is even cited: 
Harris failed in sustaining his eviden-
tiary burden of proof of clear and 
convincing evidence. The record on 
appeal clearly preponderates against him 
and the Trial Court's findings should be 
reversed. 
The following is again a totally untrue statement which would 
indicate that counsel is ignoring the mass of evidence adduced 
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in a three-session evidentiary hearing and in the multi-
session depositions of Hook and Johnson: 
P. 11, 1 3 
In the case before the Court there is 
absolutely no evidence to support the 
Court's findings. 
P. 11, 5 4 - The suggestion that the issue of fraudulent 
conveyance was not properly before the District Court has no 
basis whatsoever. 
P. 12, 5 1 - The statement at the top of page 12 that 
"there is no evidence to support the Court's findings" is 
false and misleading and can only be intended to be deceptive. 
It is a gross misstatement. 
P. 12, 5 1 - The statement that "Harris has no evidence 
to justify any of his claim" seems to sugest that counsel must 
have been asleep during a three-session evidentiary hearing. 
He obviously wasn't very aware of what happened in the 
depositions as he wasn't even present at any of the sessions 
of Hook's or Johnson's depositions. Note the deposition 
transcripts for appearances. 
P. 12, 5 2 - The contention of Johnson 
that nowhere in the volumes of 
pleadings and testimony has Harris 
introduced any reliable relevant evidence 
to portray any intent of Ms. Hook or 
Johnson to perpetrate any fraud. 
seems to ignore the whole record. Reference is made to the 
preceding pages of this brief. 
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Counsel for Johnson states: 
if. 10, f 2 
Johnson contends this Court should 
completely disregard the testimony of 
James Crafts and Marcia A. Eldridge. 
Counsel for Johnson again states that the Court: 
?• 15, 1 2 
... disallowed the testimony of Mr. James 
Craft and Marcia Eldridge as hearsay. 
The first statement on page 10 is not justified and the 
statement on page 15 is a misstatement of what happened. 
Counsel moved to have the testimony of James Craft and Marcia 
Eldridge stricken, but the Motion was taken under advisement 
(EG 9/19/89 p. 72) and counsel for Johnson never pressed for 
any ruling and none was ever made. The testimony was not 
stricken and thus stands. 
Findings of Fact made and entered by the Trial Court 
support the Conclusions of Law and the Judgment (Addm. p. 3 6-
42) . The only legitimate issues on appeal would be whether or 
not there is sufficient evidence to support the findings. The 
Appellant (Johnson) has made no real analysis of the evidence 
nor any meritorious challenge to any of the findings. The 
Appellant (Johnson) has simply argued on appeal what he did in 
the Trial Court. 
4^ Johnson's argument centering on no fraudulent 
conveyance could only apply to the boat-trailer and not to the 
boat. Again, Johnson has argued as he did in the Trial Court. 
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The finding with respect to the fraudulent conveyance was not 
essential to support the Judgment. The only real issue on 
appeal could be whether or not there was ample evidence to 
support the Findings in view of the fact that the Court 
specifically found that Hook was the owner of both the boat 
and the boat-trailer right up to the time of the last hearing 
session on September 19, 1989 (Addm. p. 64, 65); that there 
was just a purported reconveyance of the boat-trailer; but 
that any purported reconveyance of the boat-trailer was 
without receiving a reasonable equivalent value in exchange 
for the purported transfer and was with an actual intent to 
hinder, delay, and defraud Harris-Dudley. Johnson has not 
really challenged those Findings. Reference is made to 
Findings of Fact Nos. 2, 3, and 6 (TR p. 310-311 and Addm. p. 
36-39). 
The Findings were, as noted above, amply supported by the 
evidence and fully support the Conclusions of Law and the 
judgment. There is no specific challenge made to the Findings 
and no challenge would have been justified. 
5. As already pointed out, the depositions of both Hook 
and Johnson were received in evidence by stipulation (EH 
8/5/88 p. 8) . Counsel for Johnson did not appear at any of 
the deposition sessions of Johnson and neither Johnson nor his 
counsel made any appearance whatsoever at any of the 
deposition sessions of Hook. Reference is made to the 
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transcripts of those depositions. Counsel for Johnson was not 
familiar with that testimony only as he may have read the 
depositions — the Appellant's (Johnson's) brief evidences 
little awareness on the part of Appellant's counsel of the 
testimony given at those depositions. Misleading and 
unfounded statements of the Appellant (Johnson) in his brief 
have necessitated a tedious review of the transcripts of the 
hearing sessions as well as the depositions in order to cite 
evidence supporting the Findings. The position of Harris-
Dudley is something like being hit with buckshot at a distance 
— there is nothing at all fatal but needless time and delay 
have been encountered in picking it out. 
6. With respect to the testimony of James Craft and 
Marcia Eldridge, Johnson contends that the Court disallowed 
the testimony and refers to the evidentiary hearing of 
September 19, 1989, on page 80-83 of the transcript (see p. 15 
of Appellant's Brief). The pages cited have nothing to do 
with testimony of James Craft and Marcia Eldridge and 
furthermore, the Court did not disallow the testimony, but 
took Johnson's Motion to Strike under advisement (EH 9/19/89 
p. 72) and was never pressed by Johnson for any ruling. The 
testimony remains. 
7. The Appellant's (Johnson's) argument is so frivolous 
and superficial as to justify an award to the Appellee 
(Harris-Dudley) for costs and attorney's fees. 
- 39 -
CONCLUSION 
The findings of the Trial Court, with respect to the 
ownership of the boat and boat-trailer in Hook, are supported 
by substantial evidence in the record and accordingly it was 
proper for the Trial Court to deny Johnson's Motion to Quash 
and rule that Harris-Dudley was free to proceed with the 
execution sale of the boat and boat-trailer. The judgment of 
the Trial Court should be affirmed with Harris-Dudley being 
awarded its costs and attorney's fees pursuant to Rules 3 3 and 
34 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure (Addm. p. 25, 2 6-
27). // 
Respectfully submitted this ^ ~~ day of November, 1990. 
MCMURRAY, McMURRAY, DALE & 
PARKINSON, P.C. 
Macoy A. McMurray 
Attorneys for Appellee 
- 40 -
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the / day of November, 1990, 
I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF 
APPELLEE HARRIS-DUDLEY PLUMBING COMPANY to be deposited in the 
United States mail, postage prepaid, enclosed in an envelope 
addressed to: 
Matt Biljanic 
Attorney for Appellant 
7355 South 9th East 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
HARRISDU\BRIE11-1.1 
- 41 -
ADDENDUM TABLE OP CONTENTS 
Addendum Page 
§78-2a-3 1-2 
§77-18-1 3-6 
§25-1-7 7-8 
§25-1-8 9-10 
Laws 1988 Chapter 59, §16 11 
§25-6-1 through 25-6-13 12-24 
Rule 33 25 
Rule 34 26-27 
States Restitution Hearing - 8/17/87 28 
Restitution Order 29-31 
Motion for Order In Supplemental Proceeding & Order 32-35 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 36-39 
Judgment and Order 40-42 
Exhibit 1; Purported Signed-off Title to 
Boat-trailer, 4/27/87 43 
Exhibit 3; Bill of Sale Johnson to Hook 44 
Exhibit 5; Wyoming Boat registration by Johnson . . 45-46 
Exhibit 8; Utah Title Registration of Hook, 5/5/88. 47 
Exhibit 9; Affidavit of Robert D. Johnson 48-51 
Exhibit 12; Rec. Veh. Registration, 5/5/88 52 
Exhibit 13; Utah MVD owner certificate, 5/5/88. . . 53 
Exhibit 15; Affidavit of Irene Hook 54-62 
Exhibit 41; Rec. Veh. Registration, 6/22/89 . . . . 63 
Exhibit 42; Title Registration, 9/18/89 64 
Exhibit 43; Rec. Veh. Registration, 9/18/89 . . . . 65 
Exhibit 44; Title Registration, 6/22/89 66 
Exhibit 45; Rec. Veh. Registration, 12/9/88 . . . . 67 
Exhibit 46; Title Registration, 12/9/88 68 
78-2a-3 JUDICIAL CODE 
78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction [Effective until Jan-
u a r y i , l yoaj . 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraorrii™™ •* 
and to issue all wnts and process necessary to carry into efffcfits udSn^t 
orders, and decrees or in aid of its jurisdiction "s judgments, 
i n t L ^ T p p e a ^ v e r 1 1 4 5 » t e * r i s d i < « ° * . -eluding jurisdiction of 
sion. State Tax Commission, Board ctsSSuZaftoSiSX? rT"^ 
Muung, and the state engineer, n o t w i t h s t a n d i n l ' a n ^ t h t 0 ^ ^ " , 
(b) appeals from the juvenile courts; 
(c) appeals from the circuit courts; 
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in ™~- i 
except those involving a charge of a firsVde^ee or LZT?? CaS6S 
(e) appeals from district court in criminal VaTetexLrtlhnl ^T' 
a conviction of a first or capital degree felony P * m v o i v i n g 
(0 appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs in vol™ * 
criminal conviction, except those involving a f W A*~Z> involving a 
(g) appeals from district court u S ^ ^ S ^ S ^ ^ ^ 
eluding, but not limited to, divorce, annulment vrZZ* ? CaSeS, m" 
custody, support and visitation, ^ ^ n d ^ ^ Z ^ ^ *** 
(3) Th ^StT/^f t 0 t h e ? 0 U r t ° f A p p e a l s ^ S l l o S S n e Court (3) The Court of Appeals, upon its own motion only and bv theWp f^ £ 
judges of the court, may certify to the Supreme Court for Z3 ? ° f 1 ? U r 
review and determination any matter over X c h the^  Court S ^ ^ H f * 
original appellate jurisdiction. 0 U r t o f APPeals has 
C O U198°8iA P P e a l S J U r i s d i c t i o n Effective January 1, 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extranrAi~ 
and to issue all writs and process necessary to car^ into e S S f m * 
orders, and decrees or in aid of its jurisdiction its judgments, 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction irmi,,^,, • • •.• . interlocutory appeals, over: ejunsoiction, including jurisdiction of 
(a) the final orders and decrees of state and local aa0nnir><, 
from the district court review of them, exceptThePuhfZT o r appeals 
sion. State Tax Commission, Board a s S S h ^ ^ d S m C ^ 
Mming, and the state engineer, - t w i t h s t a n ^ ^ 
(b) appeals from the juvenile courts; 
(c) appeals from the circuit courts; 
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in n««- i 
except those involving a charge of a first degree
 o r c a n ^ f C&3^ 
(e) appeals from district court in criminal caTs e x L f ?n °T>-
a conviction of a first or captial degree feWP h ° S e m V ° l v i n g 
(f) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs i„vni™ 
cnminal conviction, except those involving a first de£eTci»Z£Zy; 
DISTRICT COURTS 78-2a-5 
(g) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases in-
cluding, but not limited to, divorce, annulment, property division, child 
custody, support and visitation, adoption, and paternity; and 
(h) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court. 
(3) The Court of Appeals, upon its own motion only and by the vote of four 
judges of the court, may certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate 
review and determination any matter over which the Court of Appeals has 
original appellate jurisdiction. 
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Chapter 
46b, Title 63, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings. 
History: C. 1953, 78-2a-3, enacted by L. effective January 1, 1988. See catchhne 
1986, ch. 47, § 46; 1987, ch. 161, § 304. "Amendment Notes," below 
Amended effective January 1, 1988. — Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend-
Laws 1987, ch. 161, § 304 amends this section ment, effective January 1, 1988, added Subsec-
tion (4). 
78-2a-4. Review of actions by Supreme Court. 
Review of the judgments, orders, and decrees of the Court of Appeals shall 
be by petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court. 
History: C. 1953, 78-2a-4, enacted by L. 
1986, ch. 47, § 47. 
78-2a-5. Location of Court of Appeals. 
The Court of Appeals has its principal location in Salt Lake City. The Court 
of Appeals may perform any of its functions in any location within the state. 
History: C. 1953, 78-2a-5, enacted by L. 
1986, ch. 47, § 48. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — Sufficiency of courtroom facilities 
as affecting rights of accused, 85 A.L.R.3d 918 
CHAPTER 3 
DISTRICT COURTS 
Section 
78-3-1 
78-3-1.5. 
78-3-2 
78-3-3 
78-3-4 
78-3-5 
78-3-6 
78-3-7 
78-3-8 
District judges — Number 
78-3-1.6. Repealed 
Judicial districts 
Term of judges — Vacancy 
Jurisdiction — Transfer of cases to 
circuit court — Appeals 
Repealed 
Terms — Three each year at county 
seat 
Terms in counties independent of 
each other 
Courts always open — Adiourn 
Section 
78-3-9 
78-3-10 
78-3-11 
78-3-12 
78-3-13 
ments from day to day deemed 
recesses 
Terms to be fixed annually — Clerks 
to post copy of order 
Court to be held at times fixed — 
Exceptions 
Adjournment of regular term — 
Notice 
Disagreement between district 
judges — Determination 
Judge may hold court in anv county 
on request 
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in state criminal case during its progress as Key Numbers. — Criminal Law e» 857(1). 
ground for mistrial, new trial, or reversal, 46 
A.L.R.4th 11. 
77-17-12. Defendant on bail appearing for trial may be 
committed. 
When a defendant who has given bail appears for trial, the court may, at 
any time after his appearance for trial, order him to be committed to the 
custody of the proper officer to await the judgment or further order of the 
court. 
History: C. 1953, 77-17-12, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 15, § 2. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Key Numbers. — Bail *=» 80. 
CHAPTER 18 
THE JUDGMENT 
Section 
77-18-1. 
77-18-2. 
77-18-3. 
77-18-4. 
Suspension of sentence — Proba-
tion — Supervision — Presen-
tence investigation — Stan-
dards — Confidentiality — 
Terms and conditions — Resti-
tution — Termination, revoca-
tion, modification, or extension 
— Hearings. 
Expungement and sealing of 
records. 
Disposition of fines. 
Sentence — Term — Construe 
tion. 
Section 
77-18-5. 
77-18-5.5. 
77-18-6. 
77-18-7. 
77-18-8. 
Reports by courts and prosecuting 
attorneys to Board of Pardons. 
Judgment of death — Defendant 
to select method — Time of se-
lection. 
Judgment to pay fine or restitu-
tion constitutes a lien. 
Costs imposed on defendant — 
Restrictions. 
Fine not paid — Commitment. 
77-18-1. Suspension of sentence — Probation — Supervi-
sion — Presentence investigation — Standards — 
Confidentiality — Terms and conditions — Resti-
tution — Termination, revocation, modification, 
or extension — Hearings, 
(1) (a) On a plea of guilty or no contest or conviction of any crime or of-
fense, the court may suspend the imposition or execution of sentence and 
place the defendant on probation. The court may place the defendant: 
(i) on probation under the supervision of the Department of Cor-
rections except in cases of class C misdemeanors or infractions; 
(ii) on probation with an agency of local government or with a 
private organization; or 
(iii) on bench probation under the jurisdiction of the sentencing 
court. 
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(b) The legal custody of all probationers under the supervision of the 
department is with the Department of Corrections. The legal custody of 
all probationers under the jurisdiction of the sentencing court is vested as 
ordered by the court. The court has continuing jurisdiction over all proba-
tioners. 
(2) (a) The Department of Corrections shall establish suDervision and pre-
sentence investigation standards for all individuals referred to the de-
partment. These standards shall be based on the type of offense, the 
demand for services, the availability of agency resources, the public 
safety, and other criteria established by the Department of Corrections to 
determine what level of services shall be provided. 
(b) Proposed supervision and investigation standards shall be submit-
ted to the Judicial Council and Board of Pardons on an annual basis for 
review and comment prior to adoption by the Department of Corrections. 
(c) The Judicial Council and department shall establish procedures to 
implement the supervision and investigation standards. 
(d) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually consider 
modifications to the standards based upon criteria m Subsection (2)(a) 
and other criteria as they consider appropriate. 
(e) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually prepare an 
impact report and submit it to the appropriate legislative appropriations 
committee. 
(3) Notwithstanding other provisions of law, the Department of Corrections 
is not required to supervise the probation of persons convicted of class B or C 
misdemeanors or infractions, or to conduct presentence investigation reports 
on class C misdemeanors or infractions. However, the department may super-
vise the probation of class B misdemeanants m accordance with department 
standards. 
(4) (a) Prior to the imposition of any sentence, the court may, with the 
concurrence of the defendant, continue the date for the imposition of 
sentence for a reasonable period of time for the purpose of obtaining a 
presentence investigation report from the Department of Corrections or 
information from other sources about the defendant. The presentence 
investigation report shall include a specific statement of pecuniary dam-
ages, accompanied by a recommendation from the Department of Correc-
tions regarding the payment of restitution by the defendant. The contents 
of the report are confidential and not available except for purposes of 
sentencing as provided by rule of the Judicial Council a ad for use by the 
Department of Corrections. 
(b) At the time of sentence, the court shall hear any testimony or infor-
mation the defendant or the prosecuting attorney desires to present con-
cerning the appropriate sentence. This testimony or information shall be 
presented m open court on record and m the presence of the defendant. 
(5) While on probation, and as a condition of probation, the defendant may 
be required to perform any or all of the following: 
(a) pay, m one or several sums, any fine imposed at the time of being 
placed on probation; 
(b) pay amounts required under Chapter 32a, Title 77, Defense Costs; 
(c) provide for the support of others for whose support he is legally 
liable; 
(d) participate m available treatment programs; 
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(e) serve a period of time in the county jail not to exceed one year; 
(f) serve a term of home confinement; 
(g) participate in community service restitution programs; 
(h) pay for the costs of investigation, probation, and treatment services; 
(i) make restitution or reparation to the victim or victims in accordance 
with Subsections 76-3-201(3) and (4); and 
(j) comply with other terms and conditions the court considers appro-
priate. 
(6) The Department of Corrections is responsible, upon order of the court, 
for the collection of fines and restitution during the probation period in cases 
for which the court orders supervised probation by the department. The prose-
cutor shall provide notice of the restitution order to the clerk of the court. The 
clerk shall place the order on the civil docket and shall provide notice of the 
order to the parties. The order is considered a legal judgment enforceable 
under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(7) (a) Probation may be terminated at any time at the discretion of the 
court or upon completion without violation of 36 months probation in 
felony or class A misdemeanor cases, or 12 months in cases of class B or C 
misdemeanors or infractions. If the defendant, upon expiration or termi-
nation of the probation period, has outstanding fines or restitution owing, 
the court may retain jurisdiction of the case and continue the defendant 
on bench probation or place the defendant on bench probation for the 
limited purpose of enforcing the payment of fines and restitution. Upon 
motion of the prosecutor or victim, or upon its own motion, the court may 
require the defendant to show cause why his failure to pay should not be 
treated as contempt of court or why the suspended jail or prison term 
should not be imposed. 
(b) The Department of Corrections shall notify the sentencing court 
and prosecuting attorney in writing in advance in all cases when termi-
nation of supervised probation will occur by law. The notification shall 
include a probation progress report and complete report of details on 
outstanding fines and restitution orders. 
(8) (a) Any time served by a probationer outside of confinement after hav-
ing been charged with a probation violation and prior to a hearing to 
revoke probation does not constitute service of time toward the total pro-
bation term unless the probationer is exonerated at a hearing to revoke 
the probation. Any time served in confinement awaiting a hearing or 
decision concerning revocation of probation does not constitute service of 
time toward the total probation term unless the probationer is exonerated 
at the hearing. 
(b) The running of the probation period is tolled upon the filing of a 
violation report with the court alleging a violation of the terms and condi-
tions of probation or upon the issuance of an order to show cause or 
warrant by the court. 
(9) (a) Probation may not be modified or extended except upon waiver of a 
hearing by the probationer or upon a hearing and a finding in court that 
the probationer has violated the conditions of probation. Probation may 
not be revoked except upon a hearing in court and a finding that the 
conditions of probation have been violated. 
(b) Upon the filing of an affidavit alleging with particularity facts as-
serted to constitute violation of the conditions of probation, the court that 
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authorized probation shall determine if the affidavit establishes probable 
cause to believe that revocation, modification, or extension of probation is 
justified. If the court determines there is probable cause, it shall cause to 
be served on the defendant a warrant for his arrest or a copy of the 
affidavit and an order to show cause why his probation should not be 
revoked, modified, or extended. 
(c) The order to show cause shall specify a time and place for the hear-
ing, and shall be served upon the defendant at least five days prior to the 
hearing. The defendant shall show good cause for a continuance. The 
order to show cause shall inform the defendant of a right to be repre-
sented by counsel at the hearing and to have counsel appointed for him if 
he is indigent. The order shall also inform the defendant of a right to 
present evidence. 
(d) At the hearing, the defendant shall admit or deny the allegations of 
the affidavit. If the defendant denies the allegations of the affidavit, the 
prosecuting attorney shall present evidence on the allegations. The per-
sons who have given adverse information on which the allegations are 
based shall be presented as witnesses subject to questioning by the defen-
dant unless the court for good cause otherwise orders. The defendant may 
call witnesses, appear and speak in his own behalf, and present evidence. 
(e) After the hearing the court shall make findings of fact. Upon a 
finding that the defendant violated the conditions of probation, the court 
may order the probation revoked, modified, continued, or that the entire 
probation term commence anew. If probation is revoked, the defendant 
shall be sentenced or the sentence previously imposed shall be executed. 
(10) Restitution imposed under this chapter is considered a debt for "willful 
and malicious injury" for purposes of exceptions listed to discharge in bank-
ruptcy as provided in Title 11, Section 523, U.S.C.A. 1985. 
History: C. 1953, 77-18-1, enacted by L. of Subsection (8)(a), concerning the applicabil-
1980, ch. 15, § 2; 1981, ch. 59,-§ 2; 1982, ch. ity of time served without violation while on 
9, § 1; 1983, ch. 47, § 1; 1983, ch. 68, § 1; probation; deleted Subsection (8)(c), which pro-
1983, ch. 85, § 2; 1984, ch. 20, § 1; 1985, ch. vided: "Nothing in this section precludes the 
212, § 17; 1985, ch, 229, § 1; 1987, ch. 114, court from discharging a probationer at any 
§ 1; 1989, ch. 226, § 1. time, at the discretion of the court"; deleted 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend- "Except as provided in Subsection (7)(c) of this 
ment rewrote this section, as last amended by chapter" from the beginning of Subsection 
Laws 1985, ch. 229, § 1. to the extent that a (9)(a); in Subsection (9)(b), inserted "a warrant 
detailed analysis is impracticable. for his arrest or" in the second sentence; and 
The 1989 amendment, effective April 24, made stylistic changes throughout the section. 
1989, rewrote Subsections (1), (7)(aj, and (8Kb); Severability Clause. — Section 3 of Laws 
inserted "the public safety" in the second sen- 1983, Chapter 85 provided: "If any provision of 
tence of Subsection (2)(a); inserted "on an an- this act, or the application of any provision to 
nual basis" in Subsection (2Mb); added Subsec- any person or circumstance, is held invalid, the 
tions (2)(c) through (2)(e) and (5)(j), making re- remainder of this act shall be given effect with-
lated changes in Subsection (5); added the "(a)" out the invalid provision or application." 
and "(b)" designations in Subsection (4); in- Cross-References. — Indecent public dis-
serted "upon order of the court" in the first play, incarceration without suspension of sen-
sentence of Subsection (6) and substituted "en- tence, § 76-10-1228. 
forceable under the Utah Rules of Civil Proce- Payment of costs of defense as condition of 
dure" for "under which the victim may seek probation or suspension, § 77-32a-6. 
civil remedy" in the last sentence of that sub- Presentence investigation reports, Rules 
section; deleted "45 days" following "in writ- 4-607, 6-301, Rules of Judicial Administration, 
ing" in the first sentence of Subsection (7)(b); Rules of Evidence inapplicable to sentencing 
deleted Subsection (7)(c), concerning extension and probation proceedings. Rules of Evidence, 
of probation; deleted the former first sentence Rule 1101. 
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fact if neither trustee in mortgage nor owner 
of notes pmrticipmted in or had knowledge of 
fraud. Ogden State Bank r. Barker (1895) 12 
U 27, 40 P 769, citing Pettit v. Parsons (1893) 
9 U 223, 33 P 1038. The Pettit case has been 
distinguished in 10 U 96,37 P 242. 
Debtor has right to prefer one creditor 
over another. Ogden State Bank v. Barker 
(1895) 12 U 27,40 P 769. 
fraud. Gustin v. Mathews (1902) 25 U 168, 70 
Preference*. 
w a r T m 0 1 E £ r n C 8 , ? f f e c t e d * d«*or by way of mortgage aecnnn? notes exeentari f«i 
with intent to hinder and delav inrf™-,* 
creditor in collecting hi. $ J g « 1 S £ 
of mortgage woold not be affected £ 7 % * 
wSiffAi? °^r?nM" b y Venon* fa •"»*•«* Every conveyance made 
^ t J ^ « ° e r a t 1 ^ When t h e »*™>« maJd»* ^ «• e n £ k or is 
r e m S n L t 8 ^ , " „ * 5U8ineM or traction for which theWrty 
S S S i ' f *? t h e c o n v e y ^ is an unreasonably small capU £» dSSsn"**creditors- ^  M to other persoM w h° >*«"• c r ^-
to toSSftaS" °f SUCh bUSine8S °r * - « * » . whheot regard 
a 3 S » i i 1925- Ch- * 5 5 : R S - "SB & Collated Reference* 
Right of creditors or their representatives 
to complain of voluntary transfer or pledge 
of corporate assets by corporation which sub-
sequently becomes insolvent, 117 ALR1263. 
anw"made.SrZ,UlC,!!,.by p e r s o M a b o u t t o « « » ***. Every convey. 
thToSSn ^ a l n 7,°b h g a t i 0 n iDCUrred' wW«» t fa ir consideration, when 
£ < n E J ? £ f t t e c T e y a n c V r enterin* int0 the o™***™intends 
matare^  isTaL„fo J* ™"L mCUr d e b t s bevond hia a b m t v t0 W as they mature, is fraudulent as to both present and future creditors. 
Hietory? L. 1925, ch. 42. §6- RS l<m x, 
C. 1943.33-1-6. a - 1 9 3 3 & 
Collateral References. 
Attorney's fees: conveyance or transfer in 
consideration of legal services, rendered Z « 
be rendered, as fraudulent as w a i n s T ^ 
tors. 45 ALR 2d 500. ^ M t Credl* 
Future tort, conveyance as fraudulent 
where made in contemplation of possible lia-
bility for. 38 ALR 3d 597. 
Tort claimant's right, prior to judgment, to 
attack conveyance or transfer as fraudulent, 
73 ALR 2d 749. 
veyLM made r^ a n C e t°u"nde'« **V* defraud creditor*. Every con-
S £ S ' i n t r e r y °bI igat i0n incurred- * * ^ in*°t, ^distin-
Present orTnST PJ!SUmed * law' t0 hinder' delav or d^aud either 
credftors d l t0r8 i s f r a u d u ^ » to both present and future 
C ^ i £ 1 9 * * • * • * « * . * » * 
Cross-References, 
7 6 i 1 n U d i n g C r C d i t 0 r 3 a S a m i ^meanor . 
Construction and application. 
tio?i3f S n d 0 e S n ? a p p l y w h e r « no ques-tion of fraud is raised by the pleadings; nor 
any evidence offered relating to such ques-
tion. Skeen v. Van Sickle (1932) 80 U 419, 15 
P 2d 344. 
Conveyances between relations. 
The mere fact that the transaction is 
among close relatives does not necessarily 
mean that it is invalid, but the true facts are 
subject to proof. Givan v. Lambeth (1960) 10 
U 2d 287, 351 P 2d 959. 
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A note and mortgage executed by son in 
good faith to secure a preexisting obligation 
which the son owed his father was not. a 
fraudulent conveyance. Ned J. Bowman Co v. 
White (1962) 13 U 2d 173,369 P 2d 962. 
Conveyances between dose relatives are 
subject to rigid scrutiny, but the fact that 
close relatives are involved does not render 
the conveyance fraudulent. Ned J. Bowman 
Co. v. White (1962) 13 U 2d 173,369 P 2d 962. 
Conveyance to wife. 
Where the debtor's wife had both provided 
initial funds for purchasing real estate and 
had held previously owned real estate in her 
name, fact that property on which husband's 
creditors sought judgment lien had been 
transferred from husband to wife did not 
establish intent to defraud creditors. 
Hillstead v. Leavitt (1970) 25 U 2d 82, 475 P 
2d 1017. 
Collateral References* 
Fraudulent Conveyances <£=> 24(2). 
37 CJS Fraudulent Conveyances § 33. 
37 AmJur 2d 697, Fraudulent Conveyances 
§7. 
Admissibility of declarations of grantor or 
transferor on issue as to whether conveyance 
or transfer was in fraud of creditors, 83 ALR 
1446. 
Admissibility of testimony of transferee as 
to his knowledge, purpose, intention, or good 
faith on issue whether conveyance was in 
fraud of transferor's creditors, 52 ALR 2d 
418. 
Agreement by husband that wife shall 
receive proceeds of sale of homestead as 
fraud on his creditors, 6 ALR 574. 
Attorney's fees: conveyance or transfer in 
consideration of legal services, rendered or to 
be rendered, as fraudulent against creditors. 
45 ALR 2d 500. 
Conveyance between third persons upon 
consideration furnished by debtor as within 
application of Fraudulent Conveyance Act, 91 
ALR 741. 
Conveyance or transfer by stockholder as 
fraudulent as regards his liability as stock-
holder to creditors of corporation, 89 ALR 
751. 
Creditor's receipt of proceeds of convey-
ance or transfer by debtor as estopping him 
to claim that conveyance or transfer was 
fraudulent, 9 ALR 358. 
Creditor's right to attack as fraudulent a 
conveyance by third person to debtor's 
spouse, 35 ALR 2d 8. 
Denying relief to one who conveyed his 
property to defraud his creditors as applica-
ble where the threatened claim which occa-
sioned the conveyance was piaid or was never 
established. 21 ALR 2d 589. 
Fact that the parties to a conveyance in 
fraud of creditors are not in pari delicto as 
affecting the right of the party guilty of 
fraud to relief, 7 ALR 150. 
Future tort, conveyance as fraudulent 
where made in contemplation of possible lia-
bility for, 38 ALR 3d 597. 
Gift by husband as fraud on wife, 64 ALR 
466,49 ALR 2d 521. 
Gift of debtor's services to third person as 
fraud on creditors, 28 ALR 1046. 
Liens: use of debtor's individual funds or 
property for acquisition* improvement of, or 
discharge of liens on, projwrty held in estate 
by entireties as a fraud upon creditors, 7 
ALR 2d 1104. 
Mortgage: assumption of mortgage as con-
sideration for conveyance attacked as in 
fraud of creditors, 6 ALR 2d 270. 
Principle which denies relief to party who 
has conveyed or tranaferred property in 
fraud of his creditors, as affected by execu-
tion, as part of, or as contemplated at time 
of, the fraudulent transaction, of 
reconveyance or retransf er of the property to 
him, 89 ALR 1166. 
Priority of judgment over conveyance 
made after beginning of term but prior to 
rendition of judgment, 5 ALR 1072. 
Right of grantee or transferee to be reim-
bursed for expenditures in payment of taxes 
or encumbrances on property where convey-
ance or transfer is in fraud of creditors, 8 
ALR 527. 
Right of grantee, transferee or mortgagee 
in instrument fraudulent as to creditors to 
protection to extent of consideration paid by 
him, 79 ALR 132. 
Right of grantor or transferor or his 
privies to attack conveyance or transfer 
made for purpose of evading taxation, 118 
ALR 1184. 
Right of parent as against creditor or 
lienor to make gift to minor child of latter'a 
own services, 44 ALR 876. 
Tort claimant's right, prior to judgment, to 
attack conveyance or transfer as fraudulent, 
73 ALR 2d 749. 
Transfer of property by debtor to corpora-
tion, in consideration of its stock, as a fraud 
on creditors, 85 ALR 133. 
Validity and effect as against creditors of 
change of beneficiary or assignment of insur-
ance policy from estate to individual, 6 ALR 
1173,106 ALR 596. 
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Validity as against creditors of trustee or 
one deriving his right from trustee, of con-
veyance or transfer to carry out terms of 
unenforceable parol trust, 64 ALR 576. 
Validity of assignment of future book 
accounts, 72 ALR 856. 
DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW 
Voluntary conveyance. 
Fact that grantee in voluntary conveyance 
does not participate in any fraud asrainat 
grantor's existing creditors, or that S 2 
accepts deed in good faith, without intent to 
defraud such creditors, will not relieve 
grantee from effect and operation of such 
conveyance. Ogden State Bank v. Barker 
(1895) 12 U 13,40 P 765. 
a j £ , m » n ^ ! e n ^""vy**** or assignment void- Every conveyance or 
h T S ^ •?• D g ° r otherwi8*> °* any estate or interest in lands, or 
everv^L^L , ? t?m' 0T ° f r e n t s o r P ro f i t 3 i s a u i n* therefrom, and 
o r o ^ t h ^ f P ° ^ i a n d 8 L g 0 o d 8 0 r *"»«• i n « * « or upon the rents or 
cToSL? n^! ' madeem* ««• * * « * to delay, hinder or defraud creditors, 
d e m ^ I ZST* ° L ^ e i r I a w f u l 9u i t s- dama*e8> forfeitures, debts or 
« £ £ o t l d r ^ D d °rI?er 6VidenCe 0 f d e b t S1™'9 u i t a f e n c e d , M ™ K ? A Judgment suffered, with the like intent, as against the person hindered, delayed or defrauded shall be void. ^ ^ 
Hbtory: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907 s a w * 
CI* 1917, J583; Ri5.1933 A C 1 9 4 3 . ' a i S * 
Compiler's Notes. 
187V ,^?m?.% frmeP ,3ta tUte9- ^ " P - Laws 1876, § 1017; 2 Comp. Laws 1888. § 2838. 
Construction and application. 
Statute was not intended to prevent debtor 
from paying or securing his honest debts or 
from doing equity and exact justice to all of 
h.s creditors by placing his mean" X their 
53TS **v-ParaOM (1898) l7 "S 
Assignments generally. 
Rule that sale or assignment of chattels 
unaccompanied by change of possession is' 
fraudulent per se as to e x e c u t i o n ^ S ^ o f 
or subsequent purchasers from, selle™ or 
assignor does not necessarily apply to assira-
menu, for benefit of creditors. b u Y l o n ^ S 
.n taking possession is circumstance from 
£ h l f *"&J?ay b e P ^ ' ' « * inferred Snyder v. Murdock (1899) 20 U 419,59 P 91 
Conditional sales. 
Assignment for benefit of creditors held 
void as to seller of personal property n 
assignor s possession under contract of condi-
nJSfi8*16' C O n d l t i o n o £ w h i c h * " unper-
formed, since it empowered assignee to sell 
assigned property on credit CharTes 
Lipmncott & Co. v. Rich (1899) 19 U 140"5 
Evidence of fraud. 
A prima facie case that property was con-
veyed to son of one of the defendants with 
intent to defraud judgment creditors was 
established by evidence indicating both nom-
inal consideration for the property and 
defendants' indebtedness at time of convey-
ance. Brimhall v. Grow (1971) 25 U 2d 298, 
480 P 2d 731. 
Homesteads. 
A homestead cannot be made subject of 
attack by a creditor upon ground that it was 
sold or conveyed in fraud of such creditor. 
Payson Exch. Sav. Bank v. Tietjen (1924) 63 
U 321, 225 P 598, explained in 86 U 257, 42 
P 2d 989. 
Collateral References. 
Enforceability, as between parties, of an 
executory agreement made in fraud of credi-
tors, 172 ALR 1121. 
Excessive security for debt as affecting 
question of fraud upon creditors, 138 ALR 
1051. 
Priority of judgment over conveyance 
made after beginning of term but pnor to 
rendition of judgment, 5 ALR 1072. 
Rents and profits: accountability and liabil-
ity for rents and profits of grantee of fraudu-
lently conveyed real property, 60 ALR 2d 593. 
Right of wife or child by virtue of right to 
support to maintain action to set aside con-
veyance by husband or parent as fraudulent, 
without reducing claim to judgment, 164 
ALR 524. 
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Construction and application. 
This section is substantially the same as 13 
Eliz. c 5, and is merely declaratory of the 
principles of the common law. United States 
v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day 
Saints (1888) 5 U 538,18 P 35. 
Under this section the assignment of the 
corporate property of the Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-Day Saints, pending dissolu-
tion of that corporation by Act of Congress, 
was held in fraud of the rights of the govern-
ment and void as to the receiver, the govern-
ment being included in the words "other 
persons." United States v. Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-Day Saints (1888) 5 U 538, 
18P35. 
Insolvency is not required to make this 
section operative. Ogden State Bank v. 
Barker (1895) 12 U 13,40 P 765. 
Assignments generally. 
Under former statute an assignment of 
property was not void which among other 
things provided that the assignees out of the 
proceeds of "personal property" pay, and 
that assignees accept trust and agree to exe-
cute same by disposing of the property and 
collecting the choses in action due assignor 
and applying proceeds to payment of debts. 
It does not confer authority to sell on credit 
Sprecht v. Parsons (1891) 7 U 107,25 P 730. 
Extent of invalidity of assignment. 
As general rule, assignment which is 
fraudulent in fact is void in toto. W. P. Noble 
DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW 
Mercantile Co. v. Mt. Pleasant Equitable 
Co-op. Inst. (1894) 12 U 213, 42 P 86SI distin-
guished in 15 U 110, 47 P 604 and 18 U 42, 
55P77. . . 
As general rule, assignment which is void 
in part is void in its entirety. W. P. Noble 
Mercantile Co. v. Mt Pleasant Equitable 
( ^ p . Iiist (1894) 12 U 213, 42 P ^ d i s t i n -
guished in 15 U 110, 47 P 604 and 18 U 42, 
55P77. 
Presumption of fraud. 
Where grantor was heavily indebted at 
time of his execution of voluntary convey-
ance, inference is that conveyance was fraud-
ulently made for purpose of hindering and 
delaying grantor's creditors. Ogden State 
Bank v. Barker (1895) 12 U13,40 P 765. 
Right of corporate directors to prefer 
themselves. 
Where corporation lias become insolvent 
and abandoned objects for which it was cre-
ated, its directors cannot by voluntary deed 
of assignment prefer themselves, as corpo-
rate creditors, over other such creditors 
whose claims are equidly meritorious, so as 
to secure advantage over latter by reason of 
directors' official positions and their conse-
quent superior knowledge of corporation's 
affairs. W. P. Noble Mercantile Co. v. Mt. 
Pleasant Equitable Co-op. Inst (1894) 12 U 
213, 42 P 869, distinguished in 15 U 110, 47 
P 604 and 18 U 42,55 P 77. 
25-1-9. Defrauding prior or subsequent purchasers — Effect of 
notice at time of purchase. Every conveyance of any estate or interest 
in lands, or the rents or profits of lands, and every charge upon lands, or 
the rents or profits thereof, made or created with intent to defraud prior 
or subsequent purchasers thereof for a valuable consideration shall be void 
as against such purchasers. But no such conveyance or charge shall be 
deemed fraudulent in favor of a subsequent purchaser who had actual or 
constructive notice thereof at the time of his purchase, unless it appears 
that the grantee in such conveyance, or the person to be benefited by such 
charge, was privy to the fraud intended. 
History: R.S. 1898 & OL. 1907, $§2464, 
2465; CX. 1917, §§ 5814, 5815; R.S. 1933 & C. 
1943,33-1-9. 
Compiler's Notes. 
Analogous former statute, 2 Comp. Laws 
1888, §2833. 
Mortgagor remaining in possession. 
Mortgage on stock of merchandise held 
fraudulent as to judgment creditor of mort-
gagor, where mortgagor remained in posses-
sion of mortgaged property and continued to 
sell it in usual course of business pursuant to 
merely verbal agreement with mortgagee, 
which agreement contemplated that mort-
gage was not to be paid on its due date but 
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Laws 1988 Chapter 59, §16 
(See Legislative History under §25-6-1, Addm. p. 12) 
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — The Doctrine of Part C.J.S. — 81 CJ.S. Specific Performance 
Performance as Applied to Oral Land Con- §§ 44, 45. 
tracts in Utah, 9 Utah L. Rev. 91. Key Numbers. — Specific Performance «=» 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 71 Am. Jur. 2d Specific Per- 39
 e t geq 
formance §§ 19, 20. 
25-5-9. Agent may sign for principal. 
Every instrument required by the provisions of this chapter to be subscribed 
by any party may be subscribed by the lawful agent of such party. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Authorization from only one joint tenant. 
Husband could not bind wife, who was joint 
tenant, by contract to purchase the common 
property since she had not signed the contract 
nor given written authority to agent to sign for 
her. Williams v. Singleton, 723 P.2d 421 (Utah 
1986). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 72 Am. Jur. 2d Statute of 
Frauds § 379 et seq. 
Key Numbers. — Frauds, Statute of 
116(1). 
CHAPTER 6 
UNIFORM FRAUDULENT TRANSFER 
ACT 
Section 
25-6-1. 
25-6-2. 
25-6-3. 
25-6-4. 
25-6-5. 
25-6-6. 
Short title. 
Definitions. 
Insolvency. 
Value — Transfer. 
Fraudulent transfer — Claim 
ing before or after transfer. 
Fraudulent transfer — 
ing before transfer. 
Claim 
aris-
aris-
Section 
25-6-7. 
25-6-8. 
25-6-9. 
25-6-10. 
25-6-11. 
25-6-12. 
25-6-13. 
Transfer — When made. 
Remedies of creditors. 
Good faith transfer. 
Claim for relief — Time limits. 
Legal principles applicable to chap-
ter. 
Construction of chapter. 
Applicability of chapter. 
25-6-1. Short title. 
This chapter, is known as the "Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act." 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, 5 2478; 
CX. 1917, § 5825; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 
33-5-9. 
History: C. 1953, 25A-1-1, enacted by L. 
1988, ch. 59, i 1; recompiled as C. 1953, 
2d-£-l. 
Comparable Provisions. — Other jurisdic-
tions that have adopted the Uniform Fraudu-
lent Transfer Act include: Arkansas, Califor-
nia, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Maine, Minnesota, 
Nevada, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Okla-
homa, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, 
Texas, Washington, and West Virginia. 
Compiler's Notes. — This chapter was en-
acted as §§ 25A-1-1 to 25A-1-13; it has been 
renumbered and all internal references cor-
rected accordingly under instruction from the 
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Office of Legislative Research and General 
Counsel. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1988, Chapter 59 
became effective on April 25,1988, pursuant to 
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
Cross-References. — Uniform Commercial 
Code — Sales, § 70A-2-101 et seq. 
25-6-2. Definitions. 
In this chapter 
(1) "Affiliate" means: 
(a) a person who directly or indirectly owns, controls, or holds with 
power to vote, 20% or more of the outstanding voting securities of the 
debtor, other than a person who holds the securities: 
(i) as a fiduciary or agent without sole discretionary power to 
vote the securities; or 
(ii) solely to secure a debt, if the person has not exercised the 
power to vote; 
(b) a corporation 20% or more of whose outstanding voting securi-
ties are directly or indirectly owned, controlled, or held with power to 
vote, by the debtor or a person who directly or indirectly owns, con-
trols, or holds, with power to vote, 20% or more of the outstanding 
voting securities of the debtor, other than a person who holds the 
securities: 
(i) as a fiduciary or agent without sole power to vote the secu-
rities; or 
(ii) solely to secure a debt, if the person has not exercised the 
power to vote; 
(c) a person whose business is operated by the debtor under a lease 
or other agreement, or a person substantially all of whose assets are 
controlled by the debtor; or 
(d) a person who operates the debtor's business under a lease or 
other agreement or controls substantially all of the debtor's assets. 
(2) "Asset" means property of a debtor, but does not include: 
(a) property to the extent it is encumbered by a valid lien; 
(b) property to the extent it is generally exempt under nonbank-
ruptcy law; or 
(c) an interest in property held in tenancy by the entireties to the 
extent it is not subject to process by a creditor holding a claim against 
only one tenant. 
(3) "Claim" means a right to payment, whether or not the right is 
reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, ma-
tured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or 
unsecured. 
(4) "Creditor" means a person who has a claim. 
(5) "Debt" means liability on a claim. 
(6) "Debtor" means a person who is liable on a claim. 
(7) "Insider" includes: 
(a) if the debtor is an individual: 
(i) a relative of the debtor or of a general partner of the debtor; 
(ii) a partnership in which the debtor is a general partner; 
Uniform Commercial Code — Bulk Trans-
fers, § 70A-6-101 et seq. 
Defrauding creditors as a misdemeanor, 
§ 76-6-511. 
Statute of limitations, § 78-12-26(3). 
22 A ^ ^ ^ . i _ ~ _ 1 O 
UNIFORM FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT 25-6-2 
(iii) a general partner in a partnership described in Subsection 
(7)(a)(ii); or 
(iv) a corporation of which the debtor is a director, officer, or 
person in control; 
(b) if the debtor is a corporation: 
(i) a director of the debtor; 
(ii) an officer of the debtor; 
(iii) a person in control of the debtor; 
(iv) a partnership in which the debtor is a general partner; 
(v) a general partner in a partnership described in Subsection 
(7)(b)(iv); or 
(vi) a relative of a general partner, director, officer, or person 
in control of the debtor; 
(c) if the debtor is a partnership: 
(i) a general partner in the debtor; 
(ii) a relative of a general partner in, a general partner of, or a 
person in control of the debtor; 
(iii) another partnership in which the debtor is a general part-
ner; 
(iv) a general partner in a partnership described in Subsection 
(7)(c)(iii); or 
(v) a person in control of the debtor; 
(d) an affiliate, or an insider of an affiliate as if the affiliate were 
the debtor; and 
(e) a managing agent of the debtor. 
(8) "Lien" means a charge against or an interest in property to secure 
payment of a debt or performance of an obligation, and includes a security 
interest created by agreement, a judicial lien obtained by legal or equita-
ble process or proceedings, a common-law lien, or a statutory lien. 
(9) "Person" means an individual, partnership, corporation, associa-
tion, organization, government or governmental subdivision or agency, 
business trust, estate, trust, or any other legal or commercial entity. 
(10) "Property" means anything that may be the subject of ownership. 
(11) "Relative" means an individual or an individual related to a 
spouse, related by consanguinity within the third degree as determined 
by the common law, or a spouse, and includes an individual in an adop-
tive relationship within the third degree. 
(12) "Transfer" means every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or condi-
tional, or voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with an 
asset or an interest in an asset, and includes payment of money, release, 
lease, and creation of a lien or other encumbrance. 
(13) "Valid lien" means a lien that is effective against the holder of a 
judicial lien subsequently obtained by legal or equitable process or pro-
ceedings. 
History: C. 1953, 25A-1-2, enacted by L. Effective Dates. — Laws 1988, Chapter 59 
1988, ch. 59, § 2; recompiled as C. 1953, became effective on April 25, 1988, pursuant to 
25-6-2. Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
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NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Creditors. 
Construction and application. 
Intent. 
Creditors. 
Persons having claim in tort against grantor 
which was not reduced to judgment at time of 
alleged fraudulent conveyance held "creditor" 
within meaning of this section. Zuniga v. 
Evans, 87 Utah 198, 48 P.2d 513, 101 A.LJL 
532 (1935). 
Construction and application. 
This section should be construed with liber-
ality so as to reach all artifices and evasions 
designed to rob the act of its full force and ef-
fect in preventing debtors from paying the just 
claims of their creditors. Butler v. Wilkinson, 
740 P.2d 1244 (Utah 1987). 
Intent 
Where debtors engaged in a Ponzi scheme, 
the debtors' fraudulent intent was established 
as a matter of law, notwithstanding the bank-
ruptcy trustee's burden of proving each ele-
ment of a fraudulent conveyance by clear and 
convincing evidence under this chapter. Mer-
rill v. Abbott (In re Independent Clearing 
House Co.), 77 Bankr. 843 (D. Utah 1987). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — The Bankrupt's 
Spouse: The Forgotten Character in the Bank-
ruptcy Drama, 1974 Utah L. Rev. 709, 722. 
A.L.R. — Future tort, conveyance as fraudu-
lent where made in contemplation of possible 
liability for, 38 AJLR.3d 597. 
Rule denying recovery of property to one who 
conveyed to defraud creditors as applicable 
where the claim which motivated the convey-
ance was never established, 6 A.L.R.4th 862. 
Right of secured creditor to have set aside 
fraudulent transfer of other property by his 
debtor, 8 A.L.R.4th 1123. 
Conspiracy, right of creditor to recover dam-
ages for conspiracy to defraud him of claim, 11 
A.L.R.4th 345. 
Key Numbers. — Fraudulent Conveyances 
•» 5. 
25-6-3. Insolvency. 
(1) A debtor is insolvent if the sum of the debtor's debts is greater than all 
of the debtor's assets at a fair valuation. 
(2) A debtor who is generally not paying his debts as they become due is 
presumed to be insolvent. 
(3) A partnership is insolvent under Subsection (1) if the sum of the part-
nership's debts is greater than the aggregate, at a fair valuation, of all of the 
partnership's assets and the sum of the excess of the value of each general 
partner's nonpartnership assets over the partner's nonpartnership debts. 
(4) Assets under this section do not include property that has been trans-
ferred, concealed, or removed with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors 
or that has been transferred in a manner making the transfer voidable under 
this chapter. 
(5) Debts under this section do not include an obligation to the extent it is 
secured by a valid lien on property of the debtor not included as an asset. 
History: C. 1953, 25A-1-3, enacted by L. 
1988, ch. 59, § 3; recompiled as C. 1953, 
25-6-3. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1988, Chapter 59 
became effective on April 25,1988, pursuant to 
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
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NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS insolvency in the bankruptcy sense, as this sec-
r . , tion requires merely a showing that the party's 
Allegation of insolvency.
 a a a e t g m nQt 8 u f f i c i e n t to m e e t liabilities as 
Determination of insolvency.
 t h e y ^ ^ d u e M e y e j . y Q m a l ^ CQT? ^ 
Allegation of insolvency. 569 P.2d 1094 (Utah 1977). 
Allegation of insolvency in a complaint in an In an action by a creditor to set aside an 
action to set aside a conveyance was sufficient allegedly fraudulent conveyance of ieal estate 
as against contention that it was a conclusion, by a debtor, the plaintiff did not demonstrate 
Zuniga v. Evans, 87 Utah 198,48 P.2d 513,101 that the debtor was insolvent where the only 
A.L.R. 532 (1935). evidence was that the debtor submitted two 
Determination of insolvency. checks that were returned unpaid. Furniture 
The determination of insolvency under this Mfro. Sales, Inc. v. Deamer, 680 P.2d 398 
section is not the same as the determination of (Utah 1984). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — Imputation of insolvency as de- Key Numbers. — Fraudulent Conveyances 
famatory, 49 A.L.R.3d 163. *=> 57(1). 
25-6-4. Value — Transfer. 
(1) Value is given for a transfer or an obligation if, in exchange for the 
transfer or obligation, property is transferred or an antecedent debt is secured 
or satisfied. However, value does not include an unperformed promise made 
other than in the ordinary course of the promisor's business to fiirnish support 
to the debtor or another person. 
(2) Under Subsection 25-6-5(l)(b) and Section 25-6-6, a person gives a rea-
sonably equivalent value if the person acquires an interest of the debtor in an 
asset pursuant to a regularly conducted, noncollusive foreclosure sale or exe-
cution of a power of sale for the acquisition or disposition of the interest of the 
debtor upon default under a mortgage, deed of trust, or security agreement. 
(3) A transfer is made for present value if the exchange between the debtor 
and the transferee is intended by them to be contemporaneous and is in fact 
substantially contemporaneous. 
History: C. 1953, 25A-1-4, enacted by L. Effective Dates. — Laws 1988, Chapter 59 
1988, ch. 59, § 4; recompiled as C. 1953, became effective on April 25,1988, pursuant to 
25-6-4. Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
25-6-5. Fraudulent transfer — Claim arising before or af-
ter transfer. 
(1) A transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is fraudulent as to a 
creditor, whether the creditor's claim arose before or after the transfer was 
made or the obligation was incurred, if the debtor made the transfer or in-
curred the obligation: 
(a) with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of the 
debtor; or 
(b) without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for 
the transfer or obligation; and the debtor: 
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(i) was engaged or was about to engage in a business or a transac-
tion for which the remaining assets of the debtor were unreasonably 
small in relation to the business or transaction; or 
(ii) intended to incur, or believed or reasonably should have be-
lieved that he would incur, debts beyond his ability to pay as they 
became due. 
(2) To determine "actual intent" under Subsection (l)(a), consideration may 
be given, among other factors, to whether: 
(a) the transfer or obligation was to an insider; 
(b) the debtor retained possession or control of the property transferred 
after the transfer; 
(c) the transfer or obligation was disclosed or concealed; 
(d) before the transfer was made or obligation was incurred, the debtor 
had been sued or threatened with suit; 
(e) the transfer was of substantially all the debtor's assets; 
(f) the debtor absconded; 
(g) the debtor removed or concealed assets; 
(h) the value of the consideration received by the debtor was reason-
ably equivalent to the value of the asset transferred or the amount of the 
obligation incurred; 
(i) the debtor was insolvent or became insolvent shortly after the trans-
fer was made or the obligation was incurred; 
(j) the transfer occurred shortly before or shortly after a substantial 
debt was incurred; and 
(k) the debtor transferred the essential assets of the business to a 
lienor who transferred the assets to an insider of the debtor. 
History- C. 1953, 25A-1-5, enacted by L. became effective on April 25,1988, pursuant to 
1988, ch. 59, § 5; recompiled as C. 1953, Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
25-6-5. Cross-References. — Defrauding creditors 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1988, Chapter 59 as a misdemeanor, § 76-6-511. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS Whether an assignment of an interest in an 
. . , estate was in good faith and not to hinder, de-
R d es of fraud *av o r defraud creditors, or was made for such 
Construction and application. P ^ a e . Spends upon the facts and circum-
Constructive trust. s t a n c e * surrounding the transaction, as gath-
Conveyances between relatives. « * * « * *h e ***** * ^ p l ? ^ 
FvirfpnfP Boccalero v. Bee, 102 Utah 12, 126 P.2d 1063 
EiViuence. (1Q421 
Fair consideration. VJ.JJ**J. 
"Good faith" transfer. Badges of fraud. 
Mortgagor remaining in possession. Although actual fraudulent intent must be 
Parent and child. shown to hold a conveyance fraudulent, its ex-
Assignments, istence may be inferred from the presence of 
Rule that sale or assignment of chattels, un- certain indicia of fraud or "badges of fraud." 
accompanied by change of possession, is fraud- Dahnken, Inc. v. Wilmarth, 726 P.2d 420 
ulent per se as to execution creditors of, or sub- (Utah 1986). 
sequent purchasers from, seller or assignor "Badges of fraud," from which actual intent 
does not necessarily apply to assignments for may be inferred, include, inter alia, a debtors 
benefit of creditors, but long delay in taking (1) continuing in possession and evidencing the 
possession is circumstance from which fraud prerequisites of property ownership after hav-
may be pnma facie inferred. Snyder v. Mur- ing formally conveyed all his interest in the 
dock, 20 Utah 419, 59 P. 91 (1899). property, (2) making a conveyance in anticipa-
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tion of litigation, and (3) making a conveyance 
to a family member without receiving fair con-
sideration. Dahnken, Inc. v. Wilmarth, 726 
P.2d 420 (Utah 1986). 
Construction and application. 
Statute was not intended to prevent debtor 
from paying or securing his honest debts, or 
from doing equity and exact justice to all of his 
creditors by placing his means at their dis-
posal. Billings v. Parsons, 17 Utah 22, 53 P. 
730 (1898). 
Constructive trust. 
A constructive trust was properly imposed to 
prevent unjust enrichment, where the proceeds 
from the sale of fraudulently conveyed land, 
which were in excess of the purchase price, had 
been paid into court, and a subsequent convey-
ance to a third-party purchaser for value with-
out notice could not be voided. Butler v. Wilk-
inson, 740 P.2d 1244 (Utah 1987). 
Conveyances between relatives. 
Conveyances between near relatives, calcu-
lated to prevent a creditor from realizing on his 
claim against one of such relatives, are subject 
to rigid scrutiny. Paxton v. Paxton, 80 Utah 
540, 15 P.2d 1051 (1932). 
The mere fact that the transaction is among 
close relatives does not necessarily mean that 
it is invalid, but the true facts are subject to 
proof. Givan v. Lambeth, 10 Utah 2d 287, 351 
P.2d 959 (1960). 
A note and mortgage executed by son in good 
faith to secure a preexisting obligation which 
the son owed his father was not a fraudulent 
conveyance. Ned J. Bowman Co. v. White, 13 
Utah 2d 173, 369 P.2d 962 (1962). 
Conveyances between close relatives are 
subject to rigid scrutiny, but the fact that close 
relatives are involved does not render the con-
veyance fraudulent. Ned J. Bowman Co. v. 
White, 13 Utah 2d 173, 369 P.2d 962 (1962). 
Evidence. 
Whether an assignment of an interest in an 
estate was in good faith and not to hinder, de-
lay or defraud creditors depends upon the facts 
and circumstances surrounding the transac-
tion, as gathered from the badges of fraud 
present. Boccalero v. Bee, 102 Utah 12, 126 
P.2d 1063 (1942). 
In an action on notes executed by the defen-
dants and to establish a lien on property con-
veyed by one of the defendants to his children, 
the evidence was sufficient to sustain the lower 
court's findings that the conveyances were not 
fraudulent and to sustain a judgment denying 
a lien. Givan v. Lambeth, 10 Utah 2d 287, 351 
P.2d 959 (1960). 
Whether a conveyance is fraudulent as to 
creditors must be determined from the facts of 
each case and from the circumstances sur-
rounding the transaction, keeping in mind that 
the purpose of the Fraudulent Conveyance Act 
(now see the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer 
Act) is not to prevent a debtor from securing 
his honest debt. Ned J. Bowman Co. v. White, 
13 Utah 2d 173, 369 P.2d 962 (1962). 
Fair consideration. 
Where there is a valuable consideration 
which is stated to be fair, equivalent for, and 
not disproportionate to the value of the prop-
erty conveyed, the requirement as to allega-
tions and proof of fraud is more exacting. 
Smith v. Edwards, 81 Utah 244, 17 P.2d 264 
(1932). 
Where wife owned a substantial interest in a 
joint bank account and husband executed a 
note to the wife at her request upon withdraw-
ing a substantial sum from such account to in-
vest in a hazardous business, and when it be-
came due, husband executed renewal note se-
cured by mortgage on undivided one-half inter-
est in property owned by them jointly, the orig-
inal interest note was supported by valuable 
consideration, and, hence, the mortgage was 
not fraudulent as to creditors. Williams v. Pe-
terson, 86 Utah 526, 46 P.2d 674 (1935). 
Conveyance of property worth $14,000 to 
$15,000, which netted only about $180 a year, 
to party in satisfaction of preexisting debt of 
$10,000 was not a fraudulent conveyance. 
Utah Assets Corp. v. Dooley Bros. Ass'n, 92 
Utah 577, 70 P.2d 738 (1937). 
A debt barred by the statute of limitations 
may nevertheless be consideration for the as-
signment of an interest in an estate, even as 
between close relatives. Boccalero v. Bee, 102 
Utah 12, 126 P.2d 1063 (1942). 
In suit to set aside conveyance from husband 
to wife, no actual fraudulent intent will be re-
quired, when there was no fair value or consid-
eration given, and the effect of the transfer is 
to render the grantor insolvent. Cardon v. Har-
per, 106 Utah 560,151 P.2d 99,154 A.L.R. 906 
(1944). 
A conveyance was not made in good faith, 
and there was a failure of fair consideration, 
where purchaser knew that the purchase price 
of an item was approximately only one-tenth 
the value of the item. Meyer v. General Am. 
Corp., 569 P.2d 1094 (Utah 1977). 
Satisfaction of an obligation owed the trans-
feree by a third party did not qualify as fair 
consideration under former § 25-1-4. 
Dahnken, Inc. v. Wilmarth, 726 P.2d 420 
(Utah 1986). 
An otherwise fraudulent transfer is not 
made nonfraudulent because traiisfer is made 
to satisfy a third party's obligation to the 
transferee even if the thirty party is a corpora-
tion set up by the transferor. Daimken, Inc. v. 
Wilmarth, 726 P.2d 420 (Utah 1986). 
"Good faith" transfer. 
Proof that a transferee of property knows 
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that the transferor-debtor has preferred the was not to be paid on its due date but was to be 
transferee over other creditors or that the extended from time to time. McKibbon v. Brig-
transferee actively sought the preference from ham, 18 Utah 78, 55 P. 66 (1898). 
the debtor does not support the conclusion that 
the transferee lacks good faith under former Parent and child. 
§ 25-1-7. Butler v. Wilkinson, 740 P.2d 1244 Labor performed for parents by children dur-
(Utah 1987). ing their minority will not entitle such chil-
Mortgagor remaining in possession. d r e n to compensation, so as to establish rela-
Mortgage on stock of merchandise was tion of debtor and creditor and permit parents 
fraudulent as to judgment creditor of mort- lawfully to prefer children, convey their prop-
gagor, where mortgagor remained in posses- e r t v to them, and thus place property out of 
sion of mortgaged property and continued to reach of parents' creditors whose claims were 
sell it in usual course of business pursuant to in existence at time of deed's execution. Ogden 
merely verbal agreement with mortgagee, State Bank v. Barker, 12 Utah 13, 40 P. 765 
which agreement contemplated that mortgage (1895). 
COLLATERAL, KE*U;KENCES 
AX.R. — Future tort, conveyance as fraudu- Key Numbers. — Fraudulent Conveyances 
lent where made in contemplation of possible <*=» 24(2), 71, 76(1). 
liability for, 38 A.L.IL3d 597. 
25-6-6, Fraudulent transfer — Claim arising before trans-
fer. 
(1) A transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is fraudulent as to a 
creditor whose claim arose before the transfer was made or the obligation was 
incurred if: 
(a) the debtor made the transfer or incurred the obligation without 
receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer or 
obligation and the debtor was insolvent at the time; or 
(b) the debtor became insolvent as a result of the transfer or obligation. 
(2) A transfer made by a debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor whose claim 
arose before the transfer was made if the transfer was made to an insider for 
an antecedent debt, the debtor was insolvent at the time, and the insider had 
reasonable cause to believe that the debtor was insolvent. 
History: C. 1953, 25A-1-6, enacted by L. Effective Dates. — Laws 1988, Chapter 59 
1988, ch. 59, § 6; recompiled as C. 1953, became effective on April 25,1988, pursuant to 
25-6-6. Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Mortgage. tence of a subjective intention to defraud is not 
A mortgage made without fair consideration, required. Ned J. Bowman Co. v. White, 13 
which will render the person making it insol- Utah 2d 173, 369 P.2d 962 (1962). 
vent, constitutes statutory fraud, and the exis-
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Key Numbers. — Fraudulent Conveyances 
*=» 74(1). 
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25-6-7. Transfer — When made. 
In this chapter: 
(1) A transfer is made: 
(a) with respect to an asset that is real property other than a fix-
ture, but including the interest of a seller or purchaser under a con-
tract for the sale of the asset, when the transfer is so far perfected 
that a good-faith purchaser of the asset from the debtor against 
whom applicable law permits the transfer to be perfected cannot ac-
quire an interest in the asset that is superior to the interest of the 
transferee; and 
(b) with respect to an asset that is not real property or that is a 
fixture, when the transfer is so far perfected that a creditor on a 
simple contract cannot acquire a judicial lien other than under this 
chapter that is superior to the interest of the transferee. 
(2) If applicable law permits the transfer to be perfected as provided in 
Subsection (1) and the transfer is not so perfected before the commence-
ment of an action for relief under this chapter, the transfer is deemed 
made immediately before the commencement of the action. 
(3) If applicable law does not permit the transfer to be perfected as 
provided in Subsection (1), the transfer is made when it becomes effective 
between the debtor and the transferee. 
(4) A transfer is not made until the debtor has acquired rights in the 
asset transferred. 
(5) An obligation is incurred: 
(a) if oral, when it becomes effective between the parties; or 
(b) if evidenced by a writing, when the writing executed by the 
obligor is delivered to or for the benefit of the obligee. 
History: C. 1953, 25A-1-7, enacted by L. became effective on April 25,1988, pursuant to 
1988, ch. 59, § 7; recompiled as C. 1953, Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
25-6-7. Cross-References. — Secured transactions, 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1988, Chapter 59 Chapter 9 of Title 70A. 
25-6-8. Remedies of creditors. 
(1) In an action for relief against a transfer or obligation under this chap-
ter, a creditor, subject to the limitations in Section 25-6-9, may obtain: 
(a) avoidance of the transfer or obligation to the extent necessary to 
satisfy the creditor's claim; 
(b) an attachment or other provisional remedy against the asset trans-
ferred or other property of the transferee in accordance with the proce-
dure prescribed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; 
(c) subject to applicable principles of equity and in accordance with 
applicable rules of civil procedure: 
(i) an injunction against further disposition by the debtor or a 
transferee, or both, of the asset transferred or of other property; 
(ii) appointment of a receiver to take charge of the asset trans-
ferred or of other property of the transferee; or 
(iii) any other relief the circumstances may require. 
(2) If a creditor has obtained a judgment on a claim against the debtor, the 
creditor, if the court orders, may levy execution on the asset transferred or its 
proceeds. 
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History: C. 1953, 25A-1-8, enacted by L. 
1988, ch. 59, § 8; recompiled as C. 1953, 
25-6-8. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1988, Chapter 59 
became effective on April 25,1988, pursuant to 
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Garnishment proceeding. 
Pleadings. 
Presumptions and burden of proof. 
Garnishment proceeding. 
Fact that pleadings in garnishment proceed-
ings revealed that indebtedness sued upon was 
that of individuals and that those individuals 
had no account with garnishee bank, the only 
account being with corporation owned by indi-
viduals, did not make cause of action one, un-
der this section, to set aside conveyance, and 
thus argument that court had never obtained 
jurisdiction of corporate defendant or of res 
since no service of summons was made upon 
corporation could not be maintained; the plead-
ing sufficiently averred a sham transaction be-
tween the individuals and the corporation so 
that they should be considered as identical for 
purpose of garnishment proceedings. Stine v. 
Girola, 9 Utah 2d 22, 337 P.2d 62 (1959). 
Transfer of stock could be set aside as a 
fraudulent conveyance on motion in garnish-
ment proceeding, and it was not necessary to 
file a separate action to obtain such relief. 
Jensen v. Eames, 30 Utah 2d 423, 519 P.2d 236 
(1974). 
Pleadings. 
Allegations in an action to set aside convey-
ances that the conveyances were made for the 
purpose of placing the property beyond the 
reach of creditors and were made as part of a 
scheme, without a statement of the facts from 
which the purpose could be inferred, and with-
out stating facts constituting the scheme, 
amounted to no more than the mere statement 
that the conveyances were fraudulent. Smith 
v. Edwards, 81 Utah 244, 17 P.2d 264 (1932). 
Complaint in an action to set aside a convey-
ance was not objectionable for failure to allege 
that the property involved in the conveyance 
was not exempt. Zuniga v. Evans, 87 Utah 198, 
48 P.2d 513, 101 A.L.R. 532 (1935). 
Presumptions and burden of proof. 
Where grantees were in possession of prem-
ises pursuant to a duly recorded deed and were 
paying taxes thereon, it was incumbent upon 
plaintiffs, in an action to set aside conveyance, 
to allege and prove that grantees as such did 
certain acts held themselves out in a way that 
misled plaintiffs and that plaintiffs had knowl-
edge and relied thereon. Smith v. Edwards, 81 
Utah 244, 17 P.2d 264 (1932). 
Burden of proof is not on plaintiff to show 
that property alleged to have been fraudu-
lently conveyed is not exempt from execution. 
Cardon v. Harper, 106 Utah 560, 151 P.2d 99, 
154 A.L.R. 906 (1944). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Key Numbers. — Fraudulent Conveyances 
* 217, 226 et seq. 
25-6-9. Good faith transfer. 
(1) A transfer or obligation is not voidable under Subsection 25-6-5(l)(a) 
against a person who took in good faith and for a reasonably equivalent value 
or against any subsequent transferee or obligee. 
(2) Except as otherwise provided in this section, to the extent a transfer is 
voidable in an action by a creditor under Subsection 25-6-8(l)(a), the creditor 
may recover judgment for the value of the asset transferred, as adjusted under 
Subsection (3), or the amount necessary to satisfy the creditor's claim, which-
ever is less. The judgment may be entered against: 
(a) the first transferee of the asset or the person for whose benefit the 
transfer was made; or 
(b) any subsequent transferee other than a good faith transferee who 
took for value or from any subsequent transferee. 
(3) If the judgment under Subsection (2) is based upon the value of the asset 
transferred, the judgment must be for an amount equal to the value of the 
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asset at the time of the transfer, subject to an adjustment as equities may 
require. 
(4) Notwithstanding voidability of a transfer or an obligation under this 
chapter, a good-faith transferee or obligee is entitled, to the extent of the 
value given the debtor for the transfer or obligation, to: 
(a) a lien on or a right to retain any interest in the asset transferred; 
(b) enforcement of any obligation incurred; or 
(c) a reduction in the amount of the liability on the judgment. 
(5) A transfer is not voidable under Subsection 25-6-5(l)(b) or Section 
25-6-6 if the transfer results from: 
(a) termination of a lease upon default by the debtor when the termina-
tion is pursuant to the lease and applicable law; or 
(b) enforcement of a security interest in compliance with Chapter 9, 
Title 70A, the Uniform Commercial Code. 
(6) A transfer is not voidable under Subsection 25-6-6(2): 
(a) to the extent the insider gave new value to or for the benefit of the 
debtor after the transfer was made unless the new value was secured by a 
valid lien; 
(b) if made in the ordinary course of business or financial affairs of the 
debtor and the insider; or 
(c) if made pursuant to a good-faith effort to rehabilitate the debtor and 
the transfer secured present value given for that purpose as well as an 
antecedent debt of the debtor. 
History: C. 1953, 25A-1-9, enacted by L. Effective Dates. — Laws 1988, Chapter 59 
1988, ch. 59, § 9; recompiled as C. 1953, became effective on April 25,1988, pursuant to 
25-6-9. Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Consideration. 
Constructive trust. 
Good faith. 
Previous notice of fraud. 
Purchaser. 
Consideration. 
The term "consideration" as used in former 
25-1-13 includes both a conveyance of "prop-
erty" and satisfaction of an antecedent debt. 
Merrill v. Abbott (In re Independent Clearing 
House Co.), 77 Bankr. 843 (D. Utah 1987). 
An investor in a Ponzi scheme gave "valu-
able consideration" for the transfers he re-
ceived to the extent the transfers did not ex-
ceed his undertaking, but did not give valuable 
consideration for a transfer to the extent the 
transfer exceeded the amount of his undertak-
ing. Therefore, for such transfers, former 
§ 25-1-13 was no defense. Merrill v. Abbott (In 
r
* Independent Clearing House Co.), 77 Bankr. 
iD. Utah 1987). 
constructive trust. 
A constructive trust was properly imposed to 
prevent unjust enrichment, where the proceeds 
from the sale of fraudulently conveyed land, 
which were in excess of the purchase price, had 
been paid into court, and a subsequent convey-
ance to a third-party purchaser for value with-
out notice could not be voided. Butler v. Wilk-
inson, 740 P.2d 1244 (Utah 1987). 
Good faith. 
A conveyance will fail for lack of "fair con-
sideration" if the party seeking to avoid the 
conveyance can show that the transferee did 
not take "in good faith." Merrill v. Abbott (In 
re Independent Clearing House Co.), 77 Bankr. 
843 (D. Utah 1987). 
Previous notice of fraud. 
The mere fact that an investment promises 
to pay a high rate of return may not, without 
more, put one on notice that it is fraudulent. 
Therefore, that fact alone may not mean that 
the investors in a Ponzi scheme had previous 
notice of the debtors' fraud, especially when 
the debtors actually paid the promised returns 
until the scheme collapsed. Merrill v. Abbott 
(In re Independent Clearing House Co.), 77 
Bankr. 843 (D. Utah 1987). 
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Purchaser. property through a voluntary transfer. Merrill 
The term "purchaser" as used in former v. Abbott (In re Independent Clearing House 
§ 25-1-13 includes anyone who acquires title to Co.), 77 Bankr. 843 (D. Utah 1987). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Key Numbers. — Fraudulent Conveyances 
*» 192. 
25-6-10. Claim for relief — Time limits. 
A claim for relief or cause of action regarding a fraudulent transfer or 
obligation under this chapter is extinguished unless action is brought: 
(1) under Subsection 25-6-5(l)(a), within four years after the transfer 
was made or the obligation was incurred or, if later, within one year after 
the transfer or obligation was or could reasonably have been discovered 
by the claimant; 
(2) under Subsection 25-6-5(l)(b) or 25-6-6(1), within four years after 
the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred; or 
(3) under Subsection 25-6-6(2), within one year after the transfer was 
made or the obligation was incurred. 
History: C. 1953, 25A-1-10, enacted by L. Effective Dates. — Laws 1988, Chapter 59 
1988, ch. 59, § 10; recompiled as C. 1953, became effective on April 25,1988, pursuant to 
25-6-10. Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
25-6-11. Legal principles applicable to chapter. 
Unless displaced by this chapter, the principles of law and equity, including 
merchant law and the law relating to principal and agent, equitable subordi-
nation, estoppel, laches, fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake, 
insolvency, or other validating or invalidating cause, supplement this chap-
ter's provisions. 
History: C. 1953, 25A-1-11, enacted by L. Effective Dates. — Laws 1988, Chapter 59 
1988, ch. 59, § 11; recompiled as C. 1953, became effective on April 25,1988, pursuant to 
25-G-ll. Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
25-6-12. Construction of chapter. 
This chapter shall be applied and construed to effectuate its general purpose 
to make uniform the law with respect to the subject of this chapter among 
states enacting it. 
History: C. 1953, 25A-1-12, enacted by L. Effective Dates. — Liws 1988, Chapter 59 
1988, ch. 59, § 12; recompiled as C. 1953, became effective on April 25,1988, pursuant to 
25-6-12. Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
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25-6-13. Applicability of chapter. 
This act applies when any transfer occurs after the effective date of this act. 
History: C. 1953, 25A-1-13, enacted by L. 78-12-29, and which was effectiive April 25, 
1988, ch. 59, § 13; recompiled as C. 1953, 1988. The reference probably should be to "this 
25-6-13. chapter." 
Compiler's Notes. — The term "this act" Effective Dates. — Laws 1988, Chapter 59 
means Laws 1988, Chapter 59, which appears became effective on April 25,1983, pursuant to 
as §§ 25-6-1 to 25-6-13, 78-12-25, and Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
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Rule 32. Interest on judgment. 
Unless otherwise provided by law, if a judgment for money in a civil case is 
affirmed, whatever interest is allowed by law shall be payable from the date 
the judgment was entered in the trial court. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appeal and Running of interest on judgment where both 
Error § 941. parties appeal, 11 A.L.R.4th 1099. 
C.J.S. — 5 C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 1979. Retrospective application and effect of state 
A.L.R. — Date from which interest on judg- statute or rule allowing interest or changing 
ment starts running, as affected by modifica- rate of interest on judgments or verdicts. 41 
tion of amount of judgment on appeal, 4 A.L.R.4th 694. 
A.L.R.3d 1221. Key Numbers. — Interest «=> 39(2). 
Right to interest pending appeal, 15 
A.L.R.3d 411. 
Rule 33. Damages for delay or frivolous appeal; recovery 
of attorney's fees. 
(a) Damages for delay or frivolous appeal. Except in a first appeal of 
right in a criminal case, if the court determines that a motion made or appeal 
taken under these rules is either frivolous or for delay, it shall award just 
damages, which may include single or double costs, as defined in Rule 34, 
and/or reasonable attorney fees, to the prevailing party. The court may order 
that the damages be paid by the party or by the party's attorney. 
(b) Definitions. For the purposes of these rules, a frivolous appeal, motion, 
brief, or other paper is one that is not grounded in fact, not warranted by 
existing law, or not based on a good faith argument to extend, modify, or 
reverse existing law. An appeal, motion, brief, or other paper interposed for 
the purpose of delay is one interposed for any improper purpose such as to 
harass, cause needless increase in the cost of litigation, or gain time that will 
benefit only the party filing the appeal, motion, brief, or other paper. 
to Procedures . 
(1) The court may award damages upon request of any party or upon its 
own motion. A party may request damages under this rule only as part of 
the appellees motion for summary disposition under Rule 10, as part of 
the appellees brief, or as part of a party's response to a motion or other 
paper. 
(2) If the award of damages is upon the motion of the court, the court 
shall issue to the party or the party's attorney or both an order to show 
cause why such damages should not be awarded. The order to show cause 
shall set forth the allegations which form the basis of the damages and 
permit at least ten days in which to respond unless otherwise ordered for 
good cause shown. The order to show cause may be part of the notice of 
oral argument. 
(3) If requested by a party against whom damages may be awarded, the 
court shall grant a hearing. 
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NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Frivolous appeal. 
—Defined. 
—Sanctions. 
Compiler's Notes. — All of the following 
annotations are taken from cases decided un-
der former Rule 33, R. Utah S. Ct., or former 
Rule 33, R. Utah Ct. App. 
Frivolous appeal. 
A husband's appeal from a judgment relat-
ing to alimony and distribution of marital 
property was frivolous, where there was no ba-
sis for the argument presented and the evi-
dence and law was mischaracterized and mis-
stated. Eames v. Eames, 735 P.2d 395 (Utah 
1987). 
—Defined. 
For purposes of this rule, a "frivolous" appeal 
is one having no reasonable legal or factual 
basis, as defined in Rule 40(a). Lack of good 
faith is not required. O'Brien v. Rush, 744 P.2d 
306 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
A frivolous appeal is one without reasonable 
legal or factual basis as defined in Rule 40(a). 
Backstrom Family Ltd. Partnership v. Hall, 
751 P.2d 1157 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
A frivolous appeal is one without reasonable 
legal or factual basis. Maughan v. Maughan, 
770 P.2d 156 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
—Sanctions. 
Sanctions for frivolous appeals should only 
be applied in egregious cases, to avoid chilling 
the right to appeal erroneous lower court deci-
sions. However, sanctions should be imposed 
when an appeal is obviously without any merit 
and has been taken with no reasonable likeli-
hood of prevailing. Porco v. Porco, 752 P.2d 365 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988); Maughan v. Maughan, 
770 P.2d 156 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appeal and 
Error § 912. 
C.J.S. — 5 C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 1358. 
AJLR. — Inherent power of federal district 
court to impose monetary sanctions on counsel 
in absence of contempt of court, 77 A.L.R. Fed. 
789. 
Key Numbers. — Costs *=> 259 to 263. 
Rule 34. Award of costs. 
(a) To whom allowed. Except as otherwise provided by law, if an appealis 
dismissed, costs shall be taxed against the appellant unless otherwise agreed 
by the parties or ordered by the court; if a judgment or order is affirmed, costs 
shall be taxed against appellant unless otherwise ordered; if a judgment or 
order is reversed, costs shall be taxed against the appellee unless otherwise 
ordered; if a judgment or order is affirmed or reversed in part, or is vacated, 
costs shall be allowed as ordered by the court. Costs shall not be allowed or 
taxed in a criminal case. 
(b) Costs for and against the state of Utah. In cases involving the state 
of Utah or an agency or officer thereof, an award of costs for or against the 
state shall be at the discretion of the court unless specifically required or 
prohibited by law. 
(c) Costs of briefs and attachments, record, bonds and other ex-
penses on appeal. The following may be taxed as costs in favor of the pre-
vailing party in the appeal: the actual costs of a printed or typewritten brief or 
memoranda and attachments not to exceed $3.00 for each page; actual costs 
incurred in the preparation and transmission of the record, including costs^ of 
the reporter's transcript unless otherwise ordered by the court; premiums paid 
for supersedeas or cost bonds to preserve rights pending appeal; and the fees 
for filing and docketing the appeal. 
(d) Bill of costs taxed after remittitur. When costs are awarded to a party 
in an appeal, a party claiming costs shall, within 15 days after the remittitur 
is filed with the clerk of the trial court, serve upon the adverse party and file 
458 Addendum p. 26 
UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE Rule 35 
with the clerk of the trial court an itemized and verified bill of costs The 
adverse party may within 5 days of service of the bill of costs serve and file a 
notice of objection, together with a motion to have the costs taxed by the rial 
court, If there is no objection to the cost bill within the allotted time the clerk 
of the trial court shall tax the costs as filed and enter judgment for t h S 
entitled thereto, which judgment shall be entered in the jud^nen docket w S 
die same force and effect as m the case of other judgments ofrecordL IftheTost 
S ^ n ^ S S ? *T " ^ J ° P P ° S e d ' t h e c 1 * ^ uP°n reasonable notke 
w l^flt l * * l h e C0StS " * e n t e r a f l n a i determination and judgment 
r 5 r f £ S , ^ f S U P O n b e f e r; i e r e d in t h e J u d ^ n t docket with the sameTrce 
and effect as m the case of other judgments ofrecord. The determination of the 
cases on appeal from a trial court. Within 15 days after S^expiratfon of the 
time m which a petition for rehearing may be filed or within i T d a ^ s X r an 
order denying such a petition, the party to whom costs have been awarded 
may file with the clerk of the appellate court and serve upon the adverapartv 
an itemized and verified bill of costs. The adverse party may within 5 d^vs 
after the service of the bill of costs file a notice of IbjeZt^TamAonll 
have the coste taxed by the clerk. If no objection to the cost bill is filed wSiin 
the allotted time, the clerk shall thereupon tax the costs and enter j u d S e S 
against the adverse party. If the adverse party timely objects to the cosTbiU 
o s t f £ r V ™ 0 1 1 ^ 1 6 n 0 t !T H n d lM?rin»» s h a 1 1 d e t e r m i n ^ and settle the 
costs, tax the same and a judgment shall be entered thereon against the 
adverse party. The determination by the clerk shall be reviewable by he 
court upon the request of either party made within 5 days of the entry tf 
judgmen ; unless otherwise ordered, oral argument shall not be p e l t e d A 
judgment under this section may be filed with the clerk of any dis?ri™court in 
the state, who shall docket a certified copy of the same in the manne^and 
with the same force and effect as judgments of the district courT 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appeal and C I <? * r T c A I
 J T , 
Error §§ 1009 to 1024. P Kev N^JL ^ " ^ E m T § 1979" 
Key Numbers. — Costs «= 221 et seq. 
Rule 35. Petition for rehearing. 
(a) Time for filing; contents: answer; oral argument not permitted A 
rehearing will not be granted m the absence of a petition for r ! S r m e A 
e
PnSv°nf £ T;he™S™y b e Me* ^ t h the clerk within 14 d a y f X / t h t 
entry of the decision of the court, unless the time is shortened or enlarged by 
whth S f i S S^aU StT W U h P ^ ^ ^ t y the points of law or fact 
which the petitioner claims he court has overlooked or misapprehended and 
hall contain such argument in support of the petition as the petitioner de-
K S ' . * f f f l t l o n f m u s t c e r t i fy that the petition is presented in good 
n ^ t / M °r d d a y - ° r a i af8fument i n support of the petition will not be 
S 2 ? £ ?i? " " T n S 3 P G t l t l 0 n f ° r r e h e a r i n S will be received unless re-
S n di I A C°T- 3? e anreT}°the Pet i t i°n ^ rehearing shall be filed 
within 14 days after the entry of the order requesting the answer, unless 
459 
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MINUTE BOOK FORM 101 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
County of Salt Lake - State of Utah 
TITLE: (*• PARTIES PRESENT) 
PHPNO M.ai-uvxLs 
COUNSEL: COUNSEL PRESENT) 
* & 
&VLL& y 
& 7/a*i fyujALML/ 
sMfc^A 
(J*. 
Addendum
 ? . 28 P A O E O J ^ ^ 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
Salt Lake County Attornev 
ERNIE JONES ^°*ney 
Deputy County Attorney l l l + ? * l 42? South' Suite 300 Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-7900 
I V 
1 f \ *, » 
'*« JtAv. .""•;'; S.^ft ^ j , 
v . A * . •' ^ i ill '. -' > 
I 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
IRENE HOOK, 
Defendant. 
RESTITUTION ORDER 
Case No. CR 87-172 
The above entitled matter came on regularly for hearing on 
the 17th day of August, 1987 before the Honorable Raymond S. Uno, 
one of the Judges of the above-entitled Court, sitting without a 
jury. The Defendant was present and represented by Attorney 
Cornelius Van Drunen.
 T h e State of Utah was represented by Ernie 
Jones, Deputy County Attorney. The Court having received 
evidence, both oral *T.A 
oral and aocumentary and having heard the 
arguments of counsel and having made and entered its Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law herein, 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED. ADJUDGED AND DECREED 
AS FOLLOWS: 
1. That the Defendant, Irene Hook, has unlawfully taken 
from Harris-Dudley PlumMnn. n 
7
 ^
iumblng Co., Inc. the sum of Three Hundred 
Ninety Nine Thousand Dollars ($399,GOO.00) during the period from 
1969 up to the time of the termination of her employment on 
December 3, 1986. 
2. That Judgment be and the same is hereby granted against 
the Defendant and in favor of Harris-Dudley Plumbing Co., Inc. in 
the amount of Three Hundred Ninety Nine Thousand Dollars 
($399,000.00) and the Defendant, Irene Hook, is hereby ordered to 
pay by way of restitution the aforesaid sum of Three Hundred 
Ninety-Nine Thousand Dollars ($399,000.00) to Harris Dudley 
Plumbing Co., Inc. for the unlawful sums taken by the Defendant 
as aforesaid. 
3. That the Defendant may, within thirty (30) days from 
the date of the restitution hearing on August 17, 1987, undertake 
and complete a review and verification of the accuracy of the 
books and records of Harris-Dudley Plumbing Co., Inc. and the 
aforesaid audit thereof determining the amount unlawfully taken 
by the Defendant. If the Defendant finds that the said books and 
records of Harris-Dudley Plumbing Co., Inc and/or the aforesaid 
audit are erroneous and that the amount of the Restitution Order 
should be increased or decreased accordingly, then such shall be 
called to the attention of the Court by the Defendant within the 
aforesaid thirty (30) day period, whereupon the Court shall set 
the matter for further hearing for the purpose of determining 
whether or not there has been an error in the audit which should 
result in the increase or decrease in the aforesaid judgment. 
4< Adult Probation and Parole, is responsible for 
collecting and transmitting to Harris-Hudley Plumbing Co., Inc. 
all restitution payments while the Defendant is on probation. 
Addendum p. 30 V... 
day of September, 1987. 
BY THE COURT: 
Approved as to Form: 
£LL / 
Ernie Jones/ 
Deputy Coitfity At torney 
By: ^ ^ ^ i Q X ^ 
RAYMOND S . UNO 
/^s ; /r 
l \ ^ Deputy C- . 
L;Omelius Van Drunen 
;AR .ha 
£8865 
Ilacoy A. KcMurray 42214 
McMURRAY, McMURRAY, DALE & PARKINSON 
Attorneys for Third Party 
Judgment Creditors 
The Hermes Building 
455 East Fifth South 
Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-5125 
FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE 
Salt Lake County Utah 
MAR 2 4 1988 
Oepuiy Clefk 
H^Otf 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
Tot^ 
^>b C STATE OF UTAH 
$A 
STATE OF UTAH, 
v. 
IRENE HOOK, 
Plaa.nta.ff, 
Defendant. 
HARRIS-DUDLEY PLUMBING CO., INC, 
a Utah corporation, 
MOTION FOR ORDER IN 
SUPPLEMENTAL PROCEEDING 
AND ORDER 
Case No^ . CB 87-172^ 
Judge Raymond S. Uno 
Third Party 
Judgment Creditor, 
v. 
IRENE HOOK 
Third Party 
„ Judgment Debtor 
NOTICE 
./ JEPurv 
V^L- M O T I O N 
Harris-Dudley Plumbing Co., Inc., the Third Party Judgment 
Creditor, pursuant to Rule 69 (k) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, moves the Court for an Order requiring the Defendant, 
Irene Hook, to appear before this Court to answer questions under 
oath concerning her property. 
Addendum p. 32 
This Motion is based upon the provisions of §77-18-1, Utah 
Code Annotated, lasi ~« * , 
. J.-JJ, »s amended, and upon the pleadings and 
Papers on file herein which show that on the 21st day of 
September, 1987, a Restitution Order was made and entered herein 
providing for a Judgment in favor of Harris-Dudley Plumbing Co., 
Inc., in the amount of $399,000.00 against the Defendant Irene 
Hook, who was ordered to pay by way of restitution the aforesaid 
sum, which judgment i n d o l e or in part is unpaid. 
DATED THIS tf '_
 d a y o f March_ „,,_ 
McMURRAY, McMURRAY, DALE & 
PARKINSON, P.C. 
Mi-coy A. McMurray 
Attorneys for Third Party 
Judgment Creditors 
O R D E R 
Based upon the foregoing Motion and good cause appearing 
therefor; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendant Irene Hook 
personally be and appear before the Honorable Raymond S. Uno, one 
of the Judges of the above-entitled Court, at his courtroom, at 
the Courts building, 240 East Fourth South, Salt Lake City, Utah 
on Monday, the 4th day of April, 1988 at the hour of 2:00 o'clock 
p.m., then and there to answer concerning her property. 
Costs, if any, if
 a l l o w e d, w i U b e a s s e s s e d at _he h e a r l n g 
depending on their merits. 
•2- Addendum p. 33 ,,»,:>" S 
STATE OF L^AH 
= 5* 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE > CONSTABLE'S RETURN 
I* J* DICKSON • beinq f i r s t duty sworn on oath depose and say* 
l a m a duly appointed Deputy Constable ot the F i f t h Free i net • County of Salt Lake, 
State of Utah* a c i t i z e n of the United States over the aqe of 21 years at the time ot 
service herein* and not a party to or interested in the within action* 
I received the wi th in and hereto annexed SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER on the 18 day ot 
MARCH • 1988* and served the same UPon HOOK* IRENE • 
a within named defendant personally known to me to be the defendant mentioned in said 
SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER * by ae l iver inq to and leaviiw a true copy of said SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER 
for +he defendant with HOOK* IRENE • a suitable person over the age of 
14 years* RESIDING at the usual Place oi RESIDENCE of said detendant, personally 
this 1? day of MARCH • 1988* at 6650 U* 3785 S* • 
County ot Salt Lake* State of Utah* 
I further c e r t i f y that at the time ot such service of the SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER 
I endorsed the date and place ot service and added mv name and o f f i c i a l t i t l e thereto* 
Dated th is 19 day of MARCH , 1988 
JOHN A, SINDT 
Constable's Of f ice* Salt Lake County 
Subscribed and sworn to before *ie This 19 dav of MARCH 
Hy Commission EXPi res i A p r i l 1* 1988* y j 
Notary Public • 
r% 1988* 
Fee's 
^ ^ ^ B * ^ * ~ C o u n t y
 o f S a l t L a k e 
Service*. 
Mileaflei 
3.75 
11.25 
T O T A L : % 15.00 
68865 15 DL 
Addendum p . 34 G$->> *& 
DATED THIS __ (*7 day of March, 1988. 
BY TEE COURT; 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
n * * A T T E S T 
Serve Defendant a t : u ciXON HSNOLEY 
I r ene Ho ok 9 \ £ ^ . 5 ^ A A A*TAI i 
6550 West 3785 South 4^#\XlhMJ.{>L>^K~> 
West Valley C i t y , Utah \ ^ o«>utytti*A 
_3_ Addendum p. 35 _ , - t . v , r S 
1 !')"•.•* •.''.•d'C'ii District 
Ilacoy A. McMurray #2214 
McMURRAY, McMURRAY, DALE & PARKINSON NOV 2 1989 
Attorneys for Third Party Judgment Creditor 1 .-* 
The Hermes Building ."" ^ .', ^  .r=^^..\-i * ,, 
455 East 500 South, Suite 300 • ^  /.. .* ^ vffV'^^V 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 *--+»a** 
Telephone: (801)532-5125 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, ) 
Plaintiff, ) 
V. ] 
IRENE HOOK, ; 
Defendant, ; 
HARRIS-DUDLEY PLUMBING1 COMPANY, 
a Utah corporation, ; 
Third Party Judgment 
Creditor, 
V • 
IRENE HOOK, 
Third Party Judgment 
Debtor. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
i CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
) Case No. CR 87-172 
> Judge Raymond Uno 
Evidentary hearings to determine the ownership of a 24*2" 
Fiberform boat trailer were held on June 14, 1988, August 5, 1988 
and September 19, 1989, before the Honorable Raymond Uno, one of 
the judges of the above-entitled Court, the hearings being 
incident to Robert D. Johnson's Motion to Quash on file herein. 
Macoy A. McMurray of McMurray, McMurray, Dale & Parkinson 
appeared for and on behalf of Harris-Dudley Plumbing Company, a 
Addendum p. 36 ^ 
Utah corporation and Third Party Judgment Creditor, with Matt 
Biljanic appearing for and on behalf of Movant, Robert D 
Johnson. Testimony under oath was taken, exhibits admitted 
argument made, memoranda submitted and the Court being fully 
advised in the premises, now makes and enters the following 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1- Irene Hook, received title to the subject 24•2" 
Fiberform boat from Robert D.
 Johnson by a Bill of Sale executed 
on or about May 28, 1982. She received title to the subject boat 
trailer at or about the same time. 
2. Irene Hook subsequently registered the subject boat and 
boat trailer with the Department of Motor Vehicles with the State 
of Utah and at the time of the last hearing session on September 
19, 1989, was still the registered owner of both the subject boat 
and boat trailer. 
3. Irene Hook never reconveyed the subject boat to Robert 
D. Johnson nor did shp
 0 „ Q ^ >^ 
xa she ever otherwise divest herself of the same. 
4. On December ^3 loa* u ^ ,, 
-J, 1986, Harris-Dudley Plumbing Co. 
initiated a civil a^ i--i~,, 
action against Irene Hook to recover monies 
embezzled by Xrene Hook from Harris-Dudley Plumbing Co. and on 
January 12,
 1 9 8 7, Harris-Dudley Plumbing Co. filed an Amended 
Complaint seeking, among other relief, the recovery in excess of 
$300,000 from Irene Hook. 
5- A preliminary hearing in connection with a criminal 
proceeding initiated by the c.afa nf TT„ . 
"7 tne „tate of Utah against Irene Hook in 
the above-entitled ow™,-., ^ 
e d c r i m
^al matter was held on February 4, 1987. 
Addendum p. 37 
Irene Kook later entered a plea of guilty and was sentenced on 
April 6, 1987. 
6. Robert D. Johnson claims title to both the subject boat 
and the boat trailer by virtue of a purported reconveyance to him 
by Irene Hook on or about April 27, 1987, There was no 
reconveyance of the subject boat though there was a purported 
reconveyance of the boat trailer. The purported reconveyance of 
the boat trailer was without receiving a reasonable equilavent 
value in exchange for the purported transfer and was with an 
actual intent to hinder, delay and defraud Harris-Dudley Plumbing 
Co. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact the Court now makes and 
enters the following 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Irene Hook is the owner of the subject 24f2" Fiberform 
boat and boat trailer. 
2. Any transfer or purported transfer of the ownership of 
the boat and/or boat trailer back to Robert D. Johnson on or 
about April 27, 1987, . by Irene Hook would be a fraudulent 
conveyance within the meaning of Section 75-1-7,8 Utah Code Ann., 
1953 as amended, which Sections and related Sections have since 
been repealed by Laws 1988, Chapter 59, Section 16 and replaced 
by Section 25-6-1 to 13, Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. 
3. Robert D. Johnson's Motion to Quash should be denied. 
4. Harris-Dudley Plumbing Co. should be free to proceed 
with the execution sale of the subject 24' 2" Fiberform boat and 
boat trailer. 
3 Addendum p. 38 
DATED t h i s J^jaLay of-Gctnter, 1989. 
BY THE COURT: 
-J 
<^W. District Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and accurrate copy of, 
the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law this Z-C' " 
day of October, 1989, to the following: 
Matt Biljanic 
Attorney for Third Party Judgment Creditor 
7355 South 900 East 
Midvale, UT 84047 
i -""j Jvo'c-t! District 
Macoy A. McMurrav #2214 uny o 1Q89 
McMURRAY, McMURRAY, DALE & PARKINSON '>> ! C A T 
Attorneys for Third Party Judgment Credito* ' V-\\* ^ 3l\£t-'i^ VU 
The Hermes Building > ^ M l ^ ^ > ^ 
455 East 500 South, Suite 300 ' 7 "" ">-i,cia* 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)532-5125 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
IRENE HOOK, 
Defendant, 
HARRIS-DUDLEY PLUMBING COMPANY, 
a Utah c o r p o r a t i o n , 
Thi rd P a r t y Judgment 
C r e d i t o r , 
v. 
IRENE HOOK, 
Thi rd P a r t y Judgment 
Debtor . 
JUDGMENT AND ORDER 
Case No. CR 87-172 
Judge Raymond Uno 
Evidentary hearings to determine the ownership of a 24 2 
Fiberform boat trailer were held on June 14, 1988, August 5, 1988 
and September 19, 1989, before the Honorable Raymond Uno, one of 
the judges of the above-entitled Court, the hearings being 
incident to Robert D. Johnson's Motion to Quash on file herein. 
Macoy A. McMurray of McMurray, McMurray, Dale & Parkinson 
appeared for and on behalf of Harris Dudley Plumbing Company, a 
Addendum p. 40 
Utah corporation and Third Party Judgment Creditor, with Matt 
Biljanic appearing for and on behalf of Movant, Robert D 
Johnson. Testify under oath was taken, exhibits admitted 
ardent made, memoranda submitted and the Court having made and 
entered and its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law herein 
and being fully
 advised in che p r e m i s e s _ 
NOW THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as 
follows: 
1. Irene Hook is the owner of the subject 24'2" Fiberform 
boat and trailer. 
2- Any transfer or purported transfer of the ownership of 
a t m ^ a n d / ° r b ° a t traiUr baCk " R ° b e r t D' J ° h n S O n ° n ° r 
April 27, 1987, by Irene Hook would be a fraudulent 
conveyance within the waning of Section 75-1-7,8 Utah Code Ann., 
1953 as amended, which Sections and related Sections have since 
been repealed by Laws 1,88, Chapter 59, Section 16 and replaced 
by Section 25-6-1 to 13, Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. 
3- Robert D. Johnson's Motion to Quash is hereby denied. 
*. Harris Dudley Plumbing Co. is free to proceed with the 
execution sale of the subject 24 <2« Fiberform boat and boat 
ler. 
BATED this ^  day of ^ 5 ^ 1 9 8 9 . 
BY THE COURT: 
~ District' Judge ' 
t r a i l e . 
2 Addendum p. 41 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and accurrate copy oi.^/. 
the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law this C-J _ 
day of October, 1989, to the following: 
Matt Biljanic 
Attorney for Third Party Judgment Creditor 
7355 South 900 East 
Midvale, UT 84047 
*"/?<« 
7 
Addendum p. 42 . > ~* "~ ^ 
UTAH CERTIFICATE OF TITLE 3 
REVERSE INSTRUCTIONS INFORMATION) 
VS. 
/fev> 
v>"> THIS CERTIFIES THAT THE PERSON NAMED BELOW AS OWNER HAS BEEN DULY KV*£ 
i\ REGISTERED IN THE OFFICE OF THE STATE TAX COMMISSION OF UTAH AND THAT l > '* 
"""€l APPLICATION FOR CERTIFICATE OF TITLE SHOWS SUCH VEHICLE TO BE SUBJECT TO THE \)T \ 
N LIENS ENUMERATED BELOW AND^ NO OTHERS^  _ _ _ _ _ _ V -*£•/ 
?
*~*yf~ (T OWNER"1NFORMATION""SECT1ON" 
N ^
 H 0 0 K I R E N E o 
6650 W 3785 SOUTH 
7 Q MAK^ 
79184 
DATE ISSUED Q l / 3[Q / J13- „ J*_0£OMETER 
! 5 f " ( 3 * 7 FIRST LIEN HOLDER SECTION 
BODY TYPE Oy CYL Q 
PREV TITLE/REG y - r - Q / 
FUEL 
NAM. 
ADDRE^C 
CITY STA E ZIP 
Si 
V 
\\ 
1\\\m J 
FIPST INTERSTATE BANK UT 
710 S 200 WEST ______ 
.JSL.C L I - -SAL 0 1 . 4— - - - ^ 
SECOND LIEN HOLDER SECTION 
NAME 
ADDRESS 
CITY STATE ZIP 
jg%l£N^fJ^.vTNL ^arTTJlN^ "*7? 
r w w .C 127 RfV 2 8 1 S S ? ? S ^ ll -^ 
J20554 l J ^ C 4 - » O I " v . 
RCD LIENH0LDER [>_ 
"EA^SI 
»_JI * ^ W-
. S E C T I O N , , 
k . of U t . 
f£N SECOND LIEN RELEASE SECTION ~ " K 
K SIG OF LIEN HOLDER (AS SHOWN) RELEASING INTEREST 
DATE TITLE 
r7^ OWNERS TRANSFfeK AND ODOMfeffck D lbCtOSUKt SfcCTIOlN 
l/we the undersigned owner/s as recorded hereon hereby convey transfer and assign all rights title and inWest in *his vehicle to the new 
owner as shown in Section 8 hereunder and warrant the title and the vehicle to be free and clear of any i ens or »»ncumbranv.es whatsoever 
except a lien which may be in favor of the person shown as new lien holder Section 9 hereunder 
I further certify t the best of my knowledge that the vehicle odometer reading is and that this reading 
reflects ihe actual mileage ot tne vehicle unless one of the following statements is checked 
I I ) The amount of mileage stated is in excess of 99 999 miles or | | 2 The odomc «?r reading is not tn* actual mileage 
F E W R IN INKTMUST BE NO/ARIZED) IF T ^ O OR MORE NAMES SIGNATURE 
APPEAR ON TITLE (EACH MUST SIGN 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO THIS. 
. (MUM Bfc NUCAKIZtUI If IWU UK /vtWKC ?NA/V\C;> X / / ** ""*\ 
«_-* / DAY OF L,(j[jK*^L 19 tA / SIGNATURE OF 0>ICER ADMINISTERING OATH 
r SEAL 
~<\ 
•A 
% 
25s" ~A 
-.~^NT * The Deoartment will not be responsible for false or fraudulent odometer statements made in tne assignment of the Certificate of 
AV" J Title or for errors made in recording by the Department 
r
- A ( IMPORTANT ) THIS CERTIFICATE IS EVIDENCE OF OWNERSHIP FOR THE VEHICLE DESCRIBED HEREON 
"**
3
 WHEN THIS VEHICLE IS SOLD OR TRANSFERRED, THIS INSTRUMENT, PROPERLY EN-
DORSED, MUST BE PRESENTED TO THE STATE TAX COMMISSION MOTOR VEHICLE 
DIVISION BEFORE TRANSFER CAN BE MADE 
8^ 
NAME. 
NEW OWNERS SECTION 
ADDRESC 
CITY STATE 2 ' 
© 7-011 NEW LIEN HOLDER SECTION 
NAME. 
ADDRESS. 
CITY STATE ZIP . 
DEFENDANT'S 
EXHIBIT 
STATE TAX COMMISSION OF UTAH 
CHAIRMAN 
V. p. 
K 
r-K 
K 
K 
p. 
-p. 
K 
y K 
V 
^•kMHCA^'i^arMw'VMOH^V^ 
ALTERATIONS ERASURES OR OBLITERATIONS VOID THIS CERTIFICATE ^ ^ > -
"THIS IS A LEGALLY B I N D I N G CONTRACT. IF N O T U N D E R S T O O D . SfccK COMPETENT ADVICE '* 
3tll nf §>nii> EXHIBIT "1" 
V 7 2 
ffvtutu ell iflcu li,j Zi\t*c Prtccuto: 
That 
( WIT I! WARK A S'TI F.S ) 
nocErrr v. JCHUSOU 
HwAd'f, Mali $41 27 
the SELLER , for and in consideration of the sum oi: 
to ...§?i:A?!? in hand paid by ... 
THEME V. HOOK 
the BUYER , the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, hn bargained, sold, assent d 
and transferred, and by these presents do bargain, sell, assign and transfer unto said 
BUYER that certain personal property now at 
l5**j£f& County, State of „..A£$?iL 
particularly described as follows: 
JJJJ.~lJJ?!k\i?™.3S.?j£. 
Vdiicta Uznti^lcjitLon Mo. FOF 0522W79H24VS 
And the Seller upon the consideration recited above warrants ownership of and good tide 
to said property, the right to sell the same and that there arc no liens, encumbrances or charges 
thereon or against the same and to defend the title and possession transferred to the BUYER 
against ail lawful claims. 
In Witness Whereof, have hereunto set hand this 
JUL day of .!•£.' , 1 9 . . m 
L ( / ^ ^ 
V&todiC 
APPROVED FORM — UTAH SECURITIES COMMISSION 
A F F I D A V I T 
STATE OF WYOMING ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF LARAMIE) 
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that the attached reproduction of Robert D Johnson's 
1987 boat application is a true copy of records on file in the License 
Section, Wyoming Game and Fish Department, 5400 Bishop Blvd., Cheyenne, WY 
82002. 
If the attached copies do not bear a raised seal of the Wyoming Game 
and Fish Commission and the signature of the Commission Secretary, this is 
not an official certified copy. 
GLE/NN A. SHAFFER, CHI 
SECRETARY WYOMING G. 
'ISCAL OFFICER 
/AND FISH COMMISSION 
Subscribed and sworn to before me, a notary public, Laramie County, 
Wyoming on this / £ fk day of /V) AV 1988. 
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES; U*W«* J. 6*rif* • Notoy E S T 
C0U
"
TV
 * J l K ^ STATf °* I 
LARAMIE ^ p ? WYOMING j 
My Cwwwumon Expires Doc 25, 1988 j 
BOAT 
REG-
AMOU 
FOR OFFICE USE 
NO-
CONTROL 
NT PAID 
! j 
Mr 
ONLY 
.rss-
J 
/ 
^ J P 
WYOMING BOAT REGISTRATION APPLICATION 
ANNUAL REGISTRATION FEE 
REGISTRATION TRANSFER FEE 
DUPLICATE REGISTRATION FEE 
DEALERS AND MANUFACTURERS REGISTRATION FEE-
-$5.00 
-$5.00 
-$1.00 
-$3.00 
NOTE: WATERCRAFT INTRODUCED INTO WYOMING FROM OUT OF STATE DO NOT REQUIRE 
TRANSFER FEE, ONLY THE ANNUAL REGISTRATION FEE OF $5.00. 
NOTE: PERSONS WHO PURCHASE WATERCRAFT WHICH HAVE BEEN REGISTERED FOR THE 
CURRENT YEAR BY THE PREVIOUS OWNER ARE REQUIRED TO PAY ONLY THE TRANSFER 
FEE OF $5.00. 
NOTE: PERSONS WHO PURCHASE WATERCRAFT WHICH HAVE NOT BEEN REGISTERED FOR THE 
CURRENT YEAR BY THE PREVIOUS OWNER ARE REQUIRED TO PAY FOR THE ANNUAL 
RENEWAL FEE OF $5.00, PLUS THE TRANSFER FEE OF $5.00, FOR A TOTAL FEE OF 
$10.00. 
1
 F 
\ 
PLEASE CIRCLE OR FILL IN THE APPROPRIATE ANSWER 
1. Applicant(s) narae(s) and address (as it will appear on registration certificate): 
LAST^KAME FIRST NAME MIDDLE INITIAL 
LAST NAME FIRST NAME MIDDLE INITIAL 
STREET OR BOX NUMBER CITY /STATE ZIP CODE 
2. Citizen ship of boat owner :fAy/U.S . , B. Canadian, C. Other specify 
3. Type of application: Q!) first-time Wyo. registration B. transfer to new owner 
C. renewal D. duplicate
 / <^~ 
4. Make of boat^^y^ / v^J length of boat: &? &2^_ color of boat: T^Ac^y C^y^T 
5. Use of boat: A. pleasure B. livery C. commercial D. dealer E. manufacturer 
6. Name of previous ownery^i^/^^ /y\ r^^A^. present # on boat, if any {J7~¥3 3&SV 
7. Type of propulsion: A. outboard B. inboard C,Cy inboard-outdrive D. sail 
8. Type of fuel used: (Ay ga^, B. diesel C. electric 
9. Horsepower of engine <2 J^O "~ r^ffi ^yS^Jtake of engine QAJLU~ 
10. Hull material: A. plasticB. w o o d 6 . aluminum D. steel E. other 
11% Type of construction: A. runabout B. open fishing GCL? cruiser D. houseboat 
other 
12. Manufacturers hull number: f^BFQ S'^okJ/A 7 9 n 
13. Year boat was built / 9 7 9 » date of purchase 
14. Where boat is mainly used: (j[Jl Wyoming B. Colorado C. Utah D. Nebraska 
15. Wyoming lake most used: w*lZ^Qgz^fr C^V^T7^fJ. 
16. I (we) declare that I (we) own the vessel described above and that to the best of 
(our) knowledgef^ail statenfeiits made here are correct. 
mv 
SIGN ±UL Q-/y\*Uki DATE S-C*?'? 
MAIL APPLICATION: State/of Wyoming, Game and Fi-h Department, "ATTENTION WATERCRAFT11, 
Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002 
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I do hereoy cerniy that the photostat 
copy is a true and correct copy of the 
document on file with the State Tax 
Commission \ \ \ 
-"""-^m^B* S N88 
r.ATE-NG 1"-^1*7**110" D1SPLA< DUPLICATE RECORD 
oo7E7v HOOK IRENE D ' STREET ADDRESS 
uITV cr -IF o63u W 3-55 bGuTH bT 
bALT LAKE CY UT 841fcV. 7« ^"-^ -iCK'GFIL.M 
RENEWAL-DATE TYPE TITLE-'NO TYPE T D A T F ^ ^ ' J 3 6 ^ 7 0 F R E V REGISTRAR 
... °
5 S 7
 V 1352SS6 L ,UiSa- ^ ^ » ^ T P-SSAFETY 51 YR FLATE-N 
d U &
° UT S7 BB7E7 
VEHICLE DESCRIPTION 
'IN 'ZJUBS 
-HiUS rrt WAKE STYLE M O D E L ^ Y R rYi • T - •- VIN-3T-FLG 
LL WLLC -CM I? C V L *T r u E L DI5FL NADA-KEY-rR TRAN 
LESSEE INFORMATION: 71iak " ' ln% 
NAME -- ._ ^ ,..-_„ 9 A85526 
LIEN HOLDER INFORMATION- ^ A D D R E 55 CITY ST "IP 
NAME
 c_v„ 
FIRST INTERSTATE BANK UT ^ " . " V S n * u - ? ™ ! 5 5 CITY — - ST ZIP 
COMMENTS AREA. l u a ^ ^ ^ » * T
 5 r i L T L A | ~ c y U T ^ ^ 
OP-ID EXAM-C 
91 6 6131 
:iATT BILJANIC A0323 
Accornev for involuntary 
Defendant 
7355 South 9th .East 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
Phone: 255-3576 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, . 
Plaintiff, 
vs.
 : 
IRENE HOOK, . 
Defendant. 
HARRIS DUDLEY PLUMBING CO., INC. : 
a Utah corporation, 
Third Party 
Judgment Creditor, 
vs. : 
IRENE HOOK. : 
Third Party, : 
Judgment Debtor. 
AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT D. 
Civil No. CR 87 172 
Judge Raymond S. Uno 
JOHNSON 
S'lATE OF UTAH ) 
: SS 
Countv of Salt Lake ) 
Comes now Robert D. Johnson and upon his oath deposes 
is fc:.ows• 
! . I s t a t e r h e f a l l o w i n g upon mv own i n f o r m a t i o n arui 
Addendum p . 4& 
2. That on or about February 26 and 27, 1979 I 
acquired a boat, a copy of rh* H . I U . 
coPy or the title being .attached hereto as 
exhibit A. Further ,^,« „u , 
urther, two checks are attached hereto as exhibit 
B&C which shows payment hv = **.? .. * 
v ymenc by affiant for the boat to Petersen 
Marine. 
3. That Irene Hook was to acquire a two-thirds interest 
in the boat but failed f* «, i 
railed to make payment of the monies owed to 
affiant and therefore hay ,•„«. 
rerore her interest was transferred back to this 
affiant April 27 1987 TU -
 c*. 
, i*a/. That affiant paid a debt of $6 000 
owed by Irene Hook to her parents and that amount, together with 
^.466.22 was the amount owed by Irene Hook to this affiant. The 
transfer in April, 1987 occurred because of her non-payment. 
4
'
 T h a t affiar>c is the owner of the boat which is 
che subject of a sale scheduled on April 5, 1988 at 11.-45 A.M. 
That the Defendant ha<?
 ai«„i .. , 
naS
 absolutely no interest in the boat. 
DATED this l / ^ A J4' // 
,iS
 =>V day of /fftt-lC^L- , 1988 
JZLJ)M 
of 
ROBERT D. JOHNSON 
^ SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this J " ^ ~ dav 
"T^tcl-cV^ , i988 % 
My Commission Expires 
i. 
J<nt r/.f /L. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing at: 
/ / f j t l b - ^ . 
Uv//4- / < •-J-£ Ss ' * / ^ / 
/ 
AHdpnrhim n A.Q 
• .v 
•:.:. Si 
<«+ . j 
RllRiOiT^^JFrFIILEc 
>tmrz. . 
-HOOK - M E N Y - V ^ 
' 665/3 JU 'J 17BS" ISQXitk'^  £ • • • 4 1 - . i 4 fc 4 - « * • 4 4 » • » ' « 
- - - 1 •* «•* r 
^.T.^r. 
* T tie s£ l»> v^rrirk nut.** S.'i^Qfdl.rv toV A*'? O^toi^C*** 
M * P t 4-*•••*' Jim a* r * 
\.y i _ i ! i * *,,1-'t-^i»'*»»*^ 5«|inftf<i.< i»yo.f t» <i*»"fti»i :*•••• - *•»**• '»**•: :*••«*: •••»•• • . * 
I " i r C W^CTANfYTHIS' C?J?TJflp^Jp; tf fVlDfNOLQf OWNE*3>ftP *OK IHfc VEHlCX*, DESCKftED HE KtON
 ( 
V4 Vi - - - --WHEN 4HIS^VENlClE IS SOLD- 0 8 - JRAMSFBRRliO -THIS" JNSTRUMfcNl, PKOPOUr EM- t 
- 4 * * 4 4 - » * • * * 
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jl PJV to the / 
5 I order or s ' • ' 
R
- D. JOHNSON 
P. O. BOX 7326 
4
™ 0 KlVCRSlOf DRIVF 
MUkKAY, UTAH 04107 
V * 
LJBU 
UIWUTtMMUTH.lM.T 
WalkerBank-
1 _ . - . / 19.V. 
$ . _ 
I 
1215 
-Dollars 
"ON«M o*»«t 
" « « V . UTAH 14101 
C7-
./O 
£»• i a i s 
Uz-?Ui4&. 
/oaaiU6qflB7/ 
Pay to the /?,- . . 
• order nt /—U- • 
R
- D. JOHNSON 
P. O. BOX 7326 
WO RIVCRSIDE DRIVE 
"«•«*», UTAH a w 
h r\ l7. WalkerBank ' n F • v 
AMD TRUST C O M * * — .JJUJTCOMp^ tt
» « W t00 tOUTH. £y*'*°"«* 
• ° ^ H - « A L 7 ^ ^ UTAH 04101 
_4 x 
UE, 0000050000. 
A H H c m r k i m -r% CI 
MAY 5 m e 
HSBa
»*IW«IAW;HUS?ECW1.!ST 
I d-. haJty opraty \i\at .-he psiou*!* 
r*py is 4 urea sad eurrsct a>pv n; ...-
dceunwraft a i ftU ^ati vn- Suur '<• 
— J — £ - • H * o 9 
-VRfi REC. VEH. REGISTRATION DISPLAY 
PLATE-NO OWNER STREET ADDRESS 
BT079151 HOOK IRENE D 6650 U 3785 SOUTH ST 
CITY ST ZIP CO DIST VALUE MICROFILM HULL F 
SALT LAKE CY UT 84120 18 029 12000 68616979473 PRE1.' REGISTRATION 
RENEUAL-DATE TYPE TITLE-NO TYPE _T-DATE PAYMENT P -SAFETY ST YR PLATE-NO 
04 87 _. - " ~~^, UT S7 BT0791M 
cHICLE DESCRIPTION: -HIN FBF05221M79H Z1 ASGND* UT4336ST VIN-ST-ELG 
STATUS TYPE MAKE S-TY-L-E MOflBt" YR CYL UT FUEL DISPL LENGTH TRAN-D 
L BB FBF 10 79 24 02 071186 
iSSEZ. INFORMATION: 
HAflE STREET AUUKESS CITi SrJ ZIP 
IEN HOLDER INFORMATION: 
NAME STREET ADDRESS CITI ST ZIP 
N/A 
0 0000 
COMMENTS AREA: 
FILE-CD DOC-DATE 
R 04 30 SL- O P - I D EXAfl-OFI 
OR 6666 
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& X 
H 
Clyde R. Nichols, Jr. 
Executive Director 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION 
1095 Motor Avenue 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116 
May 5 , 1988 
R. H. Hansen, Chairman 
Roger O. Tew, Commissioner 
Joe B. Pacheco, Commissioner 
G. Blaine Davis, Commissioner 
MAKE: 
YEAR: 
MODEL 
VIN 
WLLC 
1979 
: 791 
: 79184 
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN: 
The records of the Department of Motor Vehicles, State 
of Utah, reflect the following information to be correct: 
Name of Owner: Irene D. Hook 
Address: 6650 West 3785 South, Salt Lake City, UT 84120 
Make: WLLC 
Year: 1979 
Model: 791 
Body: BT 
VIN: 79184 
Lien Holder: First Interstate Bank UT 
Utah Title Number: 1552256 
Please accept this letter as Certification of the 
information on file with the State of Utah. 
If we can be of further assistance, please contact this 
Division. 
Respectfully, 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION 
Motor Vehicle Division 
kdb 
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MAY 3 1 1 9 8 
MATT BILJANIC A032J 
Attorney for i n v o l u n t a r y 
Defendant 
7355 South 9th East 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
Phone: 255-3576 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
IRENE HOOK, 
Defendant 
ilARRIS DUDLEY PLUMBING CO., INC 
,i I ' tah c o r p o r a t i o n , 
T h i r d P a r t y 
Judgment C r e d i t o r , 
vs . 
IRENE HOOK, 
Third Party, 
Judgment Debtor 
AFFIDAVIT OF IRENE HOOK 
Civil No. CR 87 172 
Judge Raymond S. Uno 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
ss 
County of Salt Lake ) 
Irene hook, by wnv of a Counter-Affidavit to che Affidavit 
Addendum p. 54 
of John R. Dudley, being first duly sworn upon oath deposes and 
says as follows: 
1. That affiant is the Defendant named in the above 
entitled matter. 
2. That on or about the 6th day of May, 1987, I 
signed a Wyoming boat registration application, item 6, with 
Che intention of transfering any interest 1 had in the boat 
described in that document to R.D. Johnson. I made the transfer 
to-1 R.D. Johnson because 1 owed him $5,000 which represented a 
baLance I owed him for acquiring the boat. Further, I owed 
R.D. Johnson the sum of $6,000 which I loaned to my parentsby 
cashier's check written on the centennial branch of the Walker 
Bank located at 1991 South 3600 West, Salt Lake City, Utah 34104. 
Further, I owed R.D. Johnson $3,060.00 for payments he made on 
my Blazer automobile and $406.22 that he made for insurance 
payments on said vehicle. That at the time I made the transfer 
o\' Lhc boat and trailer to R D. Johnson'T had borrowed $10,200.00 
on my home to pay the restitution order by the court. The 
transfer was made for a legitimate debt and not for purposes of 
defrauding anyone. 
3. That John R. Dudley personally was aware 
of the fact that 1 owed R.D. Johnson $5,000.00. That on numerous 
Addendum p. 55 
occasions he talked to me personally about the fact that R.D. 
Johnson sold the boat to me but that I had not paid him. That 
R.D. Johnson called my place of employement - Harris-Dudley 
Plumbing, Co. Inc. at least twice a month for a period of 5 years 
demanding payment of the monies I owed him or title to the boat 
and trailer. 
4. That affiant denies the statements made by John R. 
Dudley in paragraph 2 of his affidavit,and attached hereto an 
affidavit signed by Glenn A. Shaffer, Chief Fiscal Officer Sec-
retary, Wyoming Game and Fish Commission dated May 12, 1988, 
together with a copy of the Wyoming boat registration application 
showing ownership of the boat being in the name of R.D. Johnson. 
5. Affiant denies paragraph 3 of John R. Dudley's 
affidavit because Dudley and his employees kiew that R.D. Johnson 
retained an interest in the boat because of facts set forth 
in paragraph 2 of this Affidavit. 
6. Affiant denies paragraph 5 of John R. Dudley's 
affidavit and incorporates herein the information contained on 
che attached documents. 
7. Affiant denies paragraph 6 of John R. Dudley's 
affidavit and states chat che trailer was transferred April 27, 
LQ37 and the boat was transferred May b, 1937, as evidenced by 
attached documents. 
Addendum p 
8- Affianc denies che allegations concained in 
paragraph 7, 8 and 9 and incorporates by reference herein che 
information concained in che accached documents. 
9- That John R. Dudley had personal knowledge of all 
faces set forth in this affidavic as did che following named 
individuals: Ken Tingey, Tim Black, Ron Larsen, and Tex 
Mayfield. Also, Sceven Hook,Russell Hook, and Sharon Smich knew 
of che foregoing farrc
 a„,j -ii 
5 §
 races and will cescify chereco. 
10. This affiant did noc prepare a formal Bill of Sale 
based upon the fart- t-k-n- • *. 
tnat it was not required under Wyoming law, 
as the law required that would not become effective uncil 
May 22, 1987. See che letter dated December, 1937 signed by 
John Rinehard of the Wyoming Game and Fish Department, a copy 
of which is attached hereto and by reference incorporated herein 
Thac che documencs were execuccd ac an office in Green River and 
affianc was advised accordingly. 
Thac ac che presenc cime affianc has absolucely no 
interest in the boar **A -
cno boat: and craUer which has been executed upon 
by Karris-Dudley PLumbins. Co. a n d h a s h a d n o l n c e r e s c s l n c e 
M « 6. 1987 on ch. bene and A p r i l 27. 1 M 7 Q n t h, e r a l l Q r 
BATED Chis _U\ay o f yfa^ 
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SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this <*/. *"-' day of 
7//'/-'- -1983 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
-// 
My Commission Expires: Residing at: 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Affidavit of Irene Hook to Macoy A. McMurray, 
Attorneys for Plaintiff, The Hermes Building, 455 East Fifth South, 
Suite 300, Salt Lake City, Utah 34111, postage prepaid, this 
__27__ day of /rt*l<*r ,1988. 
MATT BlLJAN'lC ~Z7 
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